Inside a 40-foot shipping container from the United States, falsely declared as personal effects, were nine pistols, eight assault rifles, and 219 rounds of live ammunition. The discovery first announced by the Ghana Revenue Authority, was not just a smuggling bust but a window into a deeper, more systematic problem: the persistent attempts by criminal networks to arm violent groups in Ghana.

Four years on, the investigation shows that the weapons shipment which were concealed beneath rice and household goods in blue barrels, originated from the Port of Baltimore, Maryland, and was linked to Kojo Owusu Dartey, a U.S. Army Major stationed in North Carolina.

According to court indictment documents reviewed as part of this investigation, Kojo Owusu Dartey, orchestrated this scheme with the aid of Staff Sergeant George Archer and others. The indictment noted that these individuals knowingly violated Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(a)(1)(A) and 924 by engaging in unlicensed firearms dealing and illegally exporting weapons without a license.

U.S. federal authorities later prosecuted Dartey, securing a jury conviction in April 2024 on charges of smuggling firearms without an export license, making false statements to federal agencies, and dealing in firearms without a license. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison in February 2025.

The Ghana Police Service did not respond to a right to information request on possible conspirators in Ghana as part of the September 2021 weapons seizure.

The Attorney General’s office and the Ministry of Interior in Ghana did not respond to a right of reply request and a further request to provide status update on sixteen other cases involving major firearms seizures, diversions and arrests in the last five years in Ghana.

Infographic below:

“These weapons were likely destined for groups like violent groups in Bawku, or criminal networks,” says top national security source who spoke to us on condition of anonymity.

That pattern of opacity, and silence by the state has only fuelled a climate of impunity, enabling the very smuggling networks and violent actors the state purports to be combating.

“The big people (government officials) themselves are involved in the criminal networks that facilitate arms networks,” said security analyst Professor Kwesi Aning.

Ghana is noted as a supplier of weapons in West Africa to criminal networks. Despite no evidence that the weapons seized at the Tema port was intended for violent extremist groups, several reports have shown how Ghana’s underground artisanal firearm sector end up supporting conflicts internally and within West Africa.

According to a 2020 Small Arms Survey’s report “, Ghanaian gunsmiths are able to produce semi-automatic or automatic weapons, including copies that closely resemble factory-made counterparts such as locally made copies of AK-pattern assault rifles referred to as ‘washman’ capable of single-shot or automatic fire (with a standard 30-round magazine), as well as copies of Russian, Chinese, North Korean, Libyan, and Serbian versions of the world-renowned Soviet AK-47 automatic assault rifles.

Another report by Small Arms Survey titled: Trafficking and smuggling in the Burkina Faso– Côte d’ivoire–Mali region  also noted Ghana is a source of black-market explosives and arms trafficked into the tri-border region via routes like Bondoukou–Bouna–Varale–Doropo and through Burkina Faso’s Pô and Zabré entry points. These “ants trade” smuggling operations using motorcycles and concealed cargo supply extremist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso.

In April, 2025, the Ghana police announced it had intercepted 33,000 ammuni­tion packed in 132 boxes concealed in an Accra–Be­nin bound Hyundai bus during a routine inspection.

This is “very concerning” said the national security official. “The state must thoroughly investigate to identify the powerful people behind this.”

Ghana finds itself at a crossroads: either plug the gaping movement of arms within its own borders or risk becoming the next front in a widening regional war.

In July 2025, Ghana’s late Defence Minister, Omane Boamah, made troubling disclosures about lapses in ammunition control. “I have disclosed that in 2024, there was an incident of ammunition moving from the Ghana Armed Forces to the National Security in 2024. As we speak, the National Security Secretariat under President Mahama is investigating the movement of ammunition,” he stated.

He added: “Beyond that particular case is another one that we have uncovered, that prior to the 2024 incident, there was also theft of ammunition within the Ghana Armed Forces.

“I am raising this because such ammunitions find their way into the hands of people who are not well trained and have ulterior motives.”

“In a region where armed groups feed off weak institutions and smuggled weapons, the inability to fully prosecute arms trafficking cases is a national security failure of the highest order,” said the national security official.

“Weapons (two cases above) like these don’t just disappear. Someone is arming someone. And we may not want to admit it, but that ‘someone’ could be right across our borders or already within them,” he added.

Failure of the state to aggressively prosecute some previous weapons smuggling cases and related arrests is stark warning of how Ghana, long a beacon of stability in West Africa, can be drawn into the deadly orbit of violent extremist groups.

Jihadist groups and a family’s escape from terror

According to a 2024 report by the Dutch think tank the Clingendael Institute, Ghana’s northern frontier stretching about 500 kilometers along Burkina Faso’s volatile south has become a conduit for supplies, recruits, and safe havens that sustain jihadist insurgencies.

The report further notes that the absence of direct attacks on Ghanaian soil appears to be a calculated decision: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is avoiding disruptions to these critical supply chains and refraining from provoking Ghana’s relatively capable security forces — at least for now.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is a militant Islamist group operating across the Sahel, linked to al-Qaeda and active in insurgencies in Mali, Burkina Faso, and neighboring countries.

Meanwhile, at the Zini Refugee Camp near Ghana’s northwestern border with Burkina Faso, the effects of this growing crisis are on full display.

In the refugee camp, a dusty outpost in Ghana’s upper west region, Hajiratu, a 32-year-old mother of four, sits under a tarp, her eyes heavy with grief. Years ago, in Fada N’Gourma, Burkina Faso, JNIM militants stormed her home at dusk.

“They fired guns, took my husband, blindfolded him with his shirt, and dragged him away,” she recalls, her voice trembling. “Those who resisted were killed on the spot.”

Now among 867 refugees in Zini, a camp established in April 2024, Hajiratu grapples with an uncertain future. Just recently, 46 new arrivals from Kayaa and Pissila in Burkina Faso joined her, fleeing similar ultimatums: “convert to Islam or die,” they said.

Asata, another refugee, shares a parallel agony. Her brother was abducted by Fulbe militants, his fate unknown. “I see his terror-filled eyes every night,” she says.

“Is he alive, forced to fight, or dead?”

Such personal horrors underscore the impact of Sahel’s jihadist violence into Ghana, where porous borders allow not just militants but also the displaced to cross freely.

These accounts, gathered when journalist, Gideon Sarpong visited the camp, reflect the Sahel’s spiralling violence, with over 110,000 displaced to Northern Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire since October 2024, according to UNHCR.

The camp offers fragile safety, but food shortages and education gaps exacerbated by a shift from food aid to cash stipends leave refugees like Hajiratu and Asata dependent on dwindling support, dreaming of farmlands to rebuild their lives.

Bawku: A Tinderbox at the Border, border challenges & violent extremist groups

Just 30 kilometers from Burkina Faso, the town of Bawku simmers on the edge of collapse. A long-standing ethnic conflict between the Mamprusi and Kusasi communities has escalated into a full-blown armed standoff, transforming this north eastern outpost into one of Ghana’s most volatile frontiers.

CONTEXT: The Mamprusi, descendants of a centralized kingdom tracing roots to the 17th century and known for their warrior traditions, claim historical chieftaincy over Bawku based on providing military aid to local groups against invaders. The Kusasi, who assert indigenous status as the area’s original inhabitants, maintain a traditionally acephalous society led by earth priests (tendaanas) rather than chiefs, and view the Mamprusi as newcomers imposed by colonial British policies favoring centralized structures for indirect rule. At its core, the dispute dating back to the early 20th century and exacerbated by post-independence political meddling revolves around land ownership, chieftaincy rights, and ethnic dominance. This has fueled cycles of violence that have killed hundreds and displaced thousands.

The deeper reality, however, is that insecurity in these areas has reached such heights that even access has become perilous. Journalists working on this investigation were unable to travel to key border communities in Ghana’s Upper East Region due to a recent spike in attacks on commercial vehicles along the Bolgatanga–Bawku–Pulmakom corridor.

The situation has grown so dire that Ghana’s own Inspector General of Police came under fire during a recent visit, with one officer injured in the ambush. In June 2025, President John Mahama publicly called on the military to guarantee safe passage for all passengers regardless of ethnic affiliation and goods along the route, which is a stark admission of how compromised state security has become in parts of the country.

“Now the police are almost not in the major conflict zones in the northern region; it is only the armed forces that are left. That is how serious a trouble we are in,” said Professor Kwesi Aning.

Meanwhile, at the Hamile border post in the Upper West Region, immigration officers, speaking on condition of anonymity, described an unsettling reality: dozens of unmonitored crossing points emerge during the dry season, when, as one officer put it, “every route becomes a potential crossing.” Surveillance systems are broken or non-existent, and officials lack the basic tools to control movement. “Some people just pass through. We can’t track them, we don’t even see them,” one said.

This vulnerability exploded into violence on September 13, 2025, when irate youth, fueled by accusations that an immigration officer aided armed gunmen from Burkina Faso to cross into Ghana and wrongfully attempted to deport a refugee woman, rampaged through the post setting a vehicle ablaze, burning tires, vandalizing the office, and even leading to the tragic collapse and death of a bystander amid the chaos.

Such eruptions not only shatter fragile community trust but underscore the dire urgency of bolstering border security.

“Ghana has not invested in its borders since 1951 and if you go to any border towns, we have no equipment. Even if we claim there is a security problem, our behaviour and investment do not reflect any insecurity,” Aning added. “It is the quality of training that we give to the border officials, the equipment that are available and a general security strategy that says we see borders as more of zones of engagement and deepening relations and as zones of crime and threat.”

Ghana’s immediate past ambassador to Burkina Faso, Boniface Gambila Adagbila, offered a rare public acknowledgment of the threat. “Believe it or not, they [extremists] are able to come into Ghana and go back,” he said in a recent interview. “They move in and go back… They roam, they come to our hospitals and go back.”

This quiet infiltration appears to extend well beyond the borderlands, reaching deep into the country’s urban centers.

“Yes, porous borders can potentially be a problem. Ghana has been a facilitator of violence and criminal networks in West Africa over the last 30 years,” said Professor Aning.

“Terrorists don’t need to come here we go to them because of the criminal networks that are here and because of the level of collusion between state officials and these criminal gangs otherwise ask yourself why should galamsey (illegal small scale mining) be allowed to thrive.”

A 2023 report by Small Arms Survey noted Ghana as a key source of diverted commercial explosives feeding jihadist networks in the Sahel, where “baguette”-style dynamite from its mining sector has been traced to artisanal sites in Burkina Faso and Mali controlled by JNIM.

“Ghana remains the preferred location for the sale of stolen or confiscated firearms,” Gideon Ofosu-Peasah, an analyst with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) wrote in a recent article. “JNIM is rumoured to have numerous meeting points and hideouts on the Ghanaian side of the borders with Togo and Burkina Faso.”

The porousness is not incidental, it is structural. A 2023 report by Promediation warns that Ghana’s proximity to Burkina Faso’s Cascades region and northern Côte d’Ivoire has made its northern corridor an attractive fallback zone for armed groups. The report estimates that between 200 and 300 Ghanaian youths have already been recruited into extremist groups linked to JNIM operating in and around the northern borders.

In June 2021, Abu Dujana, a Ghanaian Fulani, carried out a JNIM suicide bombing in Mali, urging attacks in Ghana in a chilling video. Targeting his kinsmen in Karaga, Northern Region, he exploited ethnic tensions and economic desperation.

Democracy and governance analyst R. Maxwell Bone cautions, that unless the militarized approach is replaced with one that prioritizes addressing the social exclusion rendering communities vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment, the security situation will continue to deteriorate.

Way forward

Since 2000, the Bawku conflict has claimed hundreds of lives, displaced at least 2,500 residents, and destroyed over 200 homes, according to a 2024 report published by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Over 80 people have been killed since 2024 as a result of the conflict.

But the deeper concern lies in how Bawku’s chaos may be drawing the attention and presence of jihadist actors operating in Burkina Faso’s Cascades region. Ghana’s former President, Nana Akufo-Addo, did not mince words in his 2024 State of the Nation Address, calling Bawku a “wasteland of destruction and distrust,” adding, “what should concern all of us and not just the people of Bawku is that, in its current state, Bawku is an alluring magnet to mischief makers and extremists operating a few kilometers across from the border.”

Recent incidents point to the creeping militarization of the Bawku area and expansion into other areas in Ghana. Two male students of Nalerigu Senior High School were shot and killed following a violent attack by unidentified gunmen in July, 2025 believed to be linked to the Bawku conflict.

On the ground, the fear is palpable. “What’s worrying is that you have youth openly brandishing rifles young boys moving with weapons they shouldn’t have,” said Mohammed, a prominent youth leader in Bawku. (His name has been changed to protect his identity.) “Just a few days ago, they stopped a water truck from entering town near the police station. That’s how bold it’s become.”

Mohammed described a town under siege, not just by its own tensions but by a deepening sense of abandonment. “It’s very difficult to get food into Bawku. I need military escort just to travel to Bolgatanga. We are all suffering. We just keep appealing to ourselves to stop, but nothing changes.”

What fuels the conflict, he said, isn’t just old grudges it’s money, ideology, and a steady flow of arms. “The whole conflict has been radicalized. People use all their resources to support it. I know residents from outside Bawku who buy weapons and send them hidden in Land Cruisers. The guns come from cities in the south. And the quantity here is scary. People fire all night and never run out.”

Despite no conclusive record of jihadist groups’ participation in the Bawku conflict, Mohammed’s fears go beyond local dynamics. “With the jihadist situation, I wouldn’t be surprised if some people from Bawku are involved. There’s a perception that both sides have links to jihadists. I doubt it’s widespread, but you can’t rule it out.”

His warning is echoed by Sadik, a fellow youth leader, who insists not just the widespread arming of civilians, but also the role of external funding in sustaining the violence. (His name has been changed to protect his identity.)

The conditions are eerily familiar to Dr. Kaderi Noagah Bukari, a senior research fellow and Head of Department of Peace Studies at the University of Cape Coast who has mapped the evolution of armed civilian groups along Ghana’s northern borders.

“Kwelugu, for instance, is home to several armed groups formed mainly by Kusasi communities,” he said. “Originally set up to combat cattle rustling, they now resemble vigilantes very much like the armed self-defense groups operating in Burkina Faso.”

Bukari warned of a widening security vacuum. “There are ungoverned spaces in northern Ghana,” he said. “The absence of sustained state presence has allowed these groups to entrench themselves.”

While Bukari was cautious about drawing direct links between Bawku’s factions and jihadist groups like JNIM or ISIS-Sahel, he was unequivocal about the danger.

“The region is heavily weaponised. Most of the arms come from within Ghana, from major cities in the south. And when you combine that level of armament with longstanding grievances and a culture of impunity, it becomes a powder keg. Vulnerabilities like this are exactly what extremists look for.”

For Professor Aning, the most threatening contribution to insecurity in Ghana is the “human factor.”

“The inability or incapacity of those mandated by law and the constitution to provide the protection,” he explained. “The sum total of the security challenges facing the country calls into question the effectiveness and the competence of public officials who are dealing with the compounding security challenges. We need a different approach.”

Report by Gideon Sarpong.

The post Ghana’s quiet crisis: Bawku, smuggling and the extremist war next door appeared first on iWatch Africa.

About this investigation

• Thirty-two percent of companies analyzed in Ghana’s fisheries sector were either owned or controlled by politically exposed persons (PEPs), with over 80 percent showing connections to Chinese ownership interests.
• Twenty-five (25) companies analyzed showed that no director and shareholder had filed their PEP status as required by law.
• The Registrar General of Companies in Ghana had not prosecuted a single case of PEPs’ non-disclosure of status or beneficial ownership, despite promises of legal action made years earlier.
• The Fisheries Commission of Ghana and the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture lacked processes to enforce PEP regulations set by the Bank of Ghana and the country’s beneficial ownership regulations.
• Over 80 percent of companies licensed to operate fishing vessels in Ghana failed to declare beneficiary ownership, despite evidence of foreign ownership ties.

ACCRA, Ghana – Samuel Abayitey, a Ghanaian fishery observer, disappeared under mysterious circumstances while aboard the Korean-owned trawler vessel MARINE 707 in October 2023. His vanishing, just like the unresolved case of Emmanuel Essien years earlier, points to a troubling pattern of risk and vulnerability for observers in Ghana’s fisheries sector. Notably, these incidents are set against a backdrop of politically exposed persons (PEPs) and the intricate web of beneficial ownership that shields accountability.

This investigation delves deeper into the nexus of power and privilege within Ghana’s fisheries industry, revealing troubling connections between politically exposed persons, fishing trawler ownership and the pervasive lack of accountability.

At the heart of these revelations stands Kenneth Dzirasah, a former deputy speaker of Ghana’s parliament, former member of parliament for the South Tongu constituency in Ghana and prominent member of the biggest opposition party, the National Democratic Congress.

Dzirasah serves as a director and shareholder of Kenbonad Fisheries and has been identified as a PEP in the Thomson Reuters World-Check. Despite his influential status, official company records obtained showed that Dzirasah has failed to disclose his PEP status, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest, the integrity of Ghana’s regulatory framework and the effort to combat tax evasion and money laundering.

The failure to disclose PEP status raises “serious questions about money laundering, tax evasion, and influence peddling” within Ghana’s fisheries sector, underscoring the need for “greater oversight and scrutiny” says legal expert, and head of African Fisheries Transparency Network, Professor Kojo Nyarko.

In 2020, Ghana implemented stringent revisions to its anti-money laundering laws, placing heightened scrutiny on the activities of politically exposed persons. This legislative overhaul was accompanied by a directive from the central bank in 2022, designating PEPs as “high-risk” customers and requiring financial institutions to rigorously verify the source of their wealth. Additionally, the directive mandated the implementation of robust risk management systems to identify PEPs and obtain senior management approval before establishing any business relationship with them.

An assessment of company documents from 25 fishing companies authorized to operate in Ghana over the last five years unveiled a startling reality: not a single director or shareholder had disclosed their PEP status. Only four companies had ventured to declare beneficial ownership.

Shockingly, the evidence revealed that a staggering 32 percent of these companies were either owned or controlled by PEPs, with over 80 percent connected to Chinese ownership interests.

In 2020, a report by China Dialogue Ocean showed that the Meng Xin 15 fishing trawler, where Emmanuel Essien was last seen, registered under Kenbonad Fisheries, was owned by Chinese company, Dalian Mengxin Ocean Fisheries.

When iWatch Africa approached the former speaker and director of Kenbonad, Kenneth Dzirasah regarding the missing observer, the nondisclosure of his PEP status and the potential connections between his company and Chinese entities, the former speaker of parliament offered little clarity.

“It is in the pipeline [filing his PEP status],” he responded, while insisting that he “cannot assist” with any answers when pressed about his company’s relationship with Chinese interests, leaving investigators with more questions than answers.

Emmanuel Essien’s disappearance aboard the vessel registered to Kenbonad Fisheries marked not the first, but a distressing recurrence of trouble with regulatory authorities. In 2017, Ghana’s Fisheries Commission accused Kenbonad Fisheries of unauthorized fish transfers within Ghanaian waters and of operating trawlers with unqualified captains but failed to revoke their license.

The Fisheries Commission is an agency under the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture in Ghana and has an oversight role over fisheries management and development in the country.

Data obtained from the country’s ministry of fisheries during this investigation revealed a troubling pattern: Kenbonad Fisheries had previously failed to pay fishery infraction fines  imposed by the state.

Despite these allegations, Francis Ashiteye Armah, an official of the company, told iWatch Africa that, “the company had settled all outstanding fines” contradicting official records.

Ghana’s Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture and Fisheries Commission did not immediately respond to the findings from this investigation.

Nyarko argued that, “If PEPs can operate with impunity, hiding behind complex corporate structures, then the systemic issues plaguing Ghana’s fisheries sector will only deepen.”

“Without rigorous oversight, meaningful legal consequences, and a renewed commitment to transparency, the shadowy nexus of power will continue to obscure the truth, leaving lives at risk and the sector’s sustainability in peril” he added.

Ghana’s fishery sector supports the livelihoods of millions of people but persistent IUU fishing practices including opaque corporate structures which protects beneficial owners has had severe impact on fish populations which resulted in an European Commission warning (yellow card) in 2021.

Further exploration and scrutiny of official company records unearthed a troubling pattern: seven additional companies accused of evading fishery fines by the fisheries ministry shared a common denominator—politically exposed persons among their shareholders and directors.

Bright Simmons, Vice President of policy think tank, Imani Africa, illuminated the pervasive issues within Ghana’s PEP landscape in a recent blog post, asserting, “Every Ghanaian knows many PEPs who have become wealthy overnight and freely utilize the financial system without any hard questions being asked of them by anyone.”

Expanding on the concerning trend, Simmons added, “The requirement that all transactions by PEPs should be reported to the Financial Intelligence Center is also widely known to be regularly flouted because the mechanisms for identifying ‘relatives and close associates’ are lax and poorly maintained.”

The companies, shadowy PEPs and Chinese ownership interests:

Among the companies investigated is Global Marine Consult, authorized to operate the Meng Xin 5 and 6 in Ghana’s waters. Investigations revealed that the company’s directors and shareholders are presently Awurama Ofori-Ani and Edwin Ofori-Ani, both acknowledged as beneficial owners. Compelling evidence suggests that Awurama Ofori-Ani is a PEP  who, as of February 2024, had failed to declare her status. Notably, she holds a senior finance role as a director of management information systems at Volta River Authority (VRA), a power utilities company in Ghana owned by the State.

A damning report by Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) in 2021 further implicated the fishing trawler Meng Xin 5, in unauthorized transhipment and illegal adaptation of fishing gear.

According to the report, while a fine of GHS 347,690 was imposed, a mere GHS 100,000 (approx. US$ 42,507) was paid by Global Marine Consult—a fraction of the minimum fine stipulated by the country’s law.

What is striking is that from 2007 to 2015, 199 fishing trawlers were arrested for various fishery offences in Ghana according to a USAID report. The report noted that “some fines were not paid in full and in some cases the minister of fisheries accepted less the amount imposed.”

In response to our investigation, Edwin Ofori-Ani, identifying himself as Awurama Ofori-Ani’s husband, acknowledged her failure in declaring her PEP status, stating that she is “in the process of filling the documents.”

He however emphasized her extensive tenure at VRA. She has worked “all her life with the VRA since graduation from the then University of Science and Technology where she had her national service and has continued to work till her recent appointment as a director of the company,” he argued.

He also contested any outstanding fines owed by Global Marine Consult to the Fisheries Commission. “In fact, as at today, Global Marine Consult Limited does not owe a pesewa of fine to the Fisheries Commission,” he stated providing payment receipts totalling over GHC1.9m or $140,000 in fines paid over the past two years as he sought to refute claims of financial delinquency.

Previous reporting by China Dialogue Ocean unveiled a tangled web of foreign ownership linking Global Marine Consult to the Dalian Mengxin Ocean Fisheries. Despite these revelations, Edwin adamantly denied any beneficiary ownership by Dalian Meng Xin Fisheries, asserting, “the relationship between Messrs Global Marine Consult Limited and Dalian MengXin is that the former acquired the trawlers from the latter and have a working arrangement to ensure that the cost of the trawler are paid for and the trawlers handed over to the Ghanaian company. Dalian has NO shares in Global Marine.”

Steve Trent, CEO of the environmental watchdog NGO, EJF, emphasized, “The Ghanaian law expressly forbids foreign ownership of industrial trawl vessels operating under the Ghanaian flag both in terms of ownership on paper, and, crucially, in terms of those who profit from the vessel – known as the ‘beneficial owners’,” during a previously related interview with iWatch Africa.

“The 2019 Companies Act (Act 992) clarifies the definition of a beneficial owner, showing clearly that the way Chinese fishing corporations are using Ghanaian front companies is illegal,” he added.

Other companies identified with significant ties to PEPs

Continuing our investigation, Business Empire Limited emerges as a focal point in our scrutiny of PEPs within Ghana’s fisheries realm. Currently overseeing fishing trawlers LU RONG YUAN YU 927 and 926, the company’s shareholder and director lineup features Rex Daniel Wussah and Helena Korkor Doku.

Wussah, member of the National Democratic Congress, coupled with his past role as a district chief executive (DCE) of Ada East in the Greater Accra Region, underscore his political influence. Despite this, official records indicate his failure to declare his politically exposed status as of March 2024.

In response to this investigation, the former DCE stated, “l wish to let you know that l don’t hold any political office and l work as a private business person,” while failing to address other concerns regarding Chinese ownership interests in his company.

However, his assertion is contradicted by the Registrar and BoG financial regulations which specifies that a PEP encompasses an individual who “is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function.”

The investigation also identified the following PEPs connected to the fisheries sector who have all failed to disclose their PEPs status as of the end of 2023 while holding several senior roles within Ghana’s public sector.

• Patrick-Appiah Opong, director and shareholder of Jetap Fishing Company holds a senior role as a marine engineer at the Ghana Maritime Authority. Ghana Maritime Authority is a public institution which oversees all maritime-related infrastructure including vessel operations and the enforcement of international maritime conventions and national laws.
• Cecelia Akuerter, director and shareholder of Ceilakus Investment Company is a member of the National Democratic Congress and had previously contested the position of deputy national organizer of the party.
• Nana Ama Ayensua Saara III, CEO of Nasaa Company Limited holds a prominent public office as the Omanhemaa (traditional ruler) of the Denkyira Traditional Area and a board member of GCB Bank PLC, partly owned by the State. All shareholders and directors of this company had also failed to declare their PEP status despite their relationship with the CEO.
• Stephen Adjokatcher is one of the shareholders and directors of Santa Fisheries Ghana and Mystical Grace. Stephen is currently a board member of the Fisheries Commission of Ghana, the regulatory body with oversight powers over his companies raising questions of conflicts of interest. Despite his influential role, Adjokatcher has not declared his PEP status.

None of the shareholders or directors mentioned above responded promptly to our requests for comment.

Policy analyst, Bright Simmons, underscores the need for comprehensive scrutiny, writing, “concerted and consistent work is required to effectively bring issues to light and address the risks posed to Ghana’s economic well-being by PEP financial misconduct.”

During a public forum in 2020, Ghana’s Registrar General, Jemima Oware, promised sanctions, in the form of fines and jail time for companies that fail to disclose beneficial ownership information, particularly PEPs.

Despite promises of sanctions by the Registrar General, our checks three years later show a glaring lack of enforcement. Not a single case has been filed against shareholders and directors who failed to declare PEP status or beneficial ownership.

Ghana’s registrar of companies did not immediately respond to our questions about her inaction and her reaction to the findings of this investigation.

“This lack of transparency is problematic for a number of reasons, particularly in disguising the true beneficiaries of profits flowing from illicit activities in Ghana’s trawl sector, preventing those individuals from being held to account,” EJF has warned.

For fisheries expert, Professor Kojo Nyarko, the imperative to safeguard fishery observers, combat the influence of PEPs, and uphold accountability within the fisheries sector is indisputable.

The regulators’ inaction is no longer tolerable in the face of this “glaring nexus of shadowy political ownership, foreign influence and impunity,” he said.

“Remember Ghana is still within our second yellow card and we are still struggling to enforce the laws and fight against IUU fishing. Comprehensive reforms and heightened accountability are imperative.”

“Anything less jeopardizes the entire sector, risking a devastating ban on fishery exports.”

This investigation is part of the Pulitzer Ocean Reporting Network Fellowship. Daniel Abugre Anyorigya contributed to this report.

The post Unveiling the shadowy nexus: Power, PEPs and opacity in Ghana’s fisheries sector appeared first on iWatch Africa.

Afua Poma, whose trading operation was revealed in the investigative report, was found with three newly captured sea turtles in her possession at the time of her arrest, underscoring the urgency of the crisis.

The captured turtles were released back into the ocean after evidence was gathered. In a bid for leniency, Poma pleaded with the police, saying, “I am sorry about this action. Please forgive me.  I will not practice this illegal trade again.”

Poma’s arrest marks a significant step in the fight against illegal sea turtle poaching in Ghana, but her alleged partner, Kweku Essien, remains at large. The authorities are continuing their search for Essien, a key player in the illicit trade.

The police have formally charged Afua Poma with illegal possession and trade of protected species under Ghana’s Wildlife Resources Management Act 115, 2023, and she will be arraigned according to the head of the crime unit, ASP Francis Kumi.

Head of Nyanyano’s crime unit, ASP Francis Kumi, also issued a stern warning, reminding the public that the hunting, capture, and trade of sea turtles is strictly prohibited under Ghana’s Wildlife Resources Management Act 1115 (2023), which carries penalties of up to two years in prison or substantial fines for violators.

Gideon Sarpong, whose investigation ignited this crackdown, expressed satisfaction with the swift law enforcement action, stating, “As investigative journalists, our role goes beyond simply telling the story—we strive to spark change. The arrest of Afua Poma following our report is a powerful reminder that shedding light on injustice can lead to real-world action. It’s a victory not just for the sea turtles, but for the entire ocean ecosystem they sustain.”

Read more about the investigation here: The vanishing guardians of Ghana’s oceans: Exposing the sea turtle poaching crisis

Sea turtles are critical to the health of Ghana’s marine ecosystems.

The original investigation was produced in partnership with the Pulitzer Center’s Ocean Reporting Network.  Report by Gideon Sarpong.

The post Impact: Ghana police arrest sea turtle trader after iWatch Africa investigation appeared first on iWatch Africa.

Nyanyano, Ghana — In an open, unsanitary seaside shed in Nyanyano, a coastal town in Ghana’s Central Region, eight massive sea turtles lie helpless under the blazing sun, their shells baking in the heat. Flipped on their backs to prevent escape, these ancient guardians of the marine ecosystem struggle weakly in the filth, their long flippers, designed for graceful swimming, now flap weakly against the harsh conditions surrounding them. Overhead, the sun blazes on, unaware of the grim fate awaiting these Olive Ridleys.

Standing nearby, Kweku Essien, a sea turtle trader, is unapologetic about his illegal business. He openly buys sea turtles from poachers and local fishers, profiting from the dwindling populations of one of the ocean’s most majestic species. Scattered around the shed, journalists also discovered the shells of previously slaughtered turtles, underscoring the grim reality of Essien’s operation and the severity of the problem.

“I sell the large turtles for 500 [$40] cedis each,” he revealed to iWatch Africa’s undercover team. The team watches as Essien proudly gestures to the captured turtles and a nearby slaughterhouse.

“We will kill all of them and transport them to the market in Mankessim [a nearby town] if we do not get buyers by the beginning of the closed fishing season on Monday.”

“We also have customers who come with their own means of transportation to buy them alive. They need to be sold quickly—after a week, they will die. These ones [turtles] have already been here for four days,” he said casually, flipping one of the massive Olive Ridleys onto its belly to show the journalists it’s still alive. 

“We can also transport it to your choice of location,” he added.

Essien is far from alone in the turtle poaching business. His partner, known in the community as “Maame Turtle [Mother Turtle],” has been involved in the trade for several years, building a reputation in the illegal market.

The casual admission to journalists about their illegal trade highlights the grim reality: the illegal trade in sea turtles is thriving, despite international and local laws aimed at protecting them. In Ghana, where economic hardship drives fishers to seek quick profit, these majestic creatures have become victims in the relentless quest for survival.

The investigation also uncovered more captured sea turtles around Nyanyano, caught by fishers and awaiting the same grim fate. This paints a sobering picture of the ongoing poaching crisis, showing just how perilous the situation is for sea turtles in Ghana.

A struggling economy and a desperate Trade

In Ghana’s coastal waters, the primary nesting season for sea turtles—Olive Ridley, Leatherback, and Green—runs from September through February. According to Dr. Andrews Agyekumhene, a marine scientist from the University of Ghana, Olive Ridleys are the most commonly observed species. 

Olive Ridley nesting sites in Ghana are considered as “major” due to the high nesting density according to a 2020 report by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) SSC Marine Turtle Specialist Group.

However, a 2021 research paper co-authored by Dr Agyekumhene revealed a shocking decline in nesting activity in some parts of Ghana—a 46% drop since the peak in 2013.

The IUCN red list, categorizes six of the seven marine turtle species as Vulnerable, Endangered, or Critically Endangered globally with Leatherback and Olive Ridley turtles listed as “Vulnerable” on a global scale.

“For years, these turtles have returned to our shores, only to find fewer safe places to nest,” Dr. Agyekumhene told iWatch Africa. His research points to human activity as the main culprit.

“All seven species of sea turtles are globally threatened with extinction due to a range of anthropogenic sources of mortality,” he adds. 

But in Ghana, the illegal poaching and sale of sea turtles, like those in Essien’s shed, represent “one of the gravest threats” to their survival.

The sea turtles Essien sells are often captured by local fishers like Okyeame Kwesi Atta, who face a difficult choice between adhering to the law and providing for their families.

Kwesi admitted to the iWatch Africa team: “When we get enough money from fishing, we won’t be tempted to engage in illegal activities, but when times are hard, and a turtle is caught in the net, we sell it. I can get 300 cedis [$20] for one.” 

For Kwesi and others like him, the temptation is too great. Despite knowing the sea turtles’ importance to the ecosystem and the legends that surround them—some communities even worship turtles as gods—the economic pressures of daily life override reverence.

“We have been told not to poach sea turtles,” Kwesi admits. “But the sea turtles are always there. We can’t ignore them when we are struggling to catch fish to feed our families.”

The loss of sea turtles has far-reaching consequences for Ghana’s coastal waters. According to the Sea Turtle Conservancy, an international sea turtle research and conservation group, sea turtles play a crucial role in maintaining marine ecosystems by grazing on seagrass, which helps keep seagrass beds healthy and supports a wide range of marine life.

Dr. Agyekumhene has also spent years researching how sea turtles contribute to the health of the ocean emphasizes this point: “When you kill one turtle, it affects several other aspects of the ocean. Sea turtles feed on jellyfish, keeping their population in check, which in turn supports fish populations. They also feed on sponges, which helps maintain coral reefs. If turtles disappear, the entire marine ecosystem could collapse.”

Despite their critical role in the ecosystem, sea turtles continue to be targeted, not just for their meat but also for their shells, which are “illegally sold and transported to neighboring countries like Togo and Ivory Coast,” he disclosed.

“Poaching happens in all the communities in Ghana where turtles nest, even in protected areas,” says Dr. Agyekumhene underscoring the widespread nature of the threat.

“The fishers know it’s illegal, so they often sell the turtles secretly to fishmongers who smoke the meat and sell it in the market.”

Laws and enforcement: A struggle to protect the vulnerable

Ghana is a signatory to several international agreements that protect sea turtles, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS).

Ghana’s Wildlife Conservation Regulations Bill of 1971 (LI 685) classifies sea turtles as a Schedule 1 species, granting them full protection. This means it is illegal to capture, possess, or sell any part of a sea turtle, whether in the water or on nesting beaches, Dr. Agyekumhene explained.

However, the reality on the ground tells a different story as Essien’s open trading shows, enforcement of these laws is often lacking.

Vivian Addo, manager of the Muni-Pomadze Ramsar site under Ghana’s Wildlife Division, is one of the officials tasked with protecting these endangered species. She acknowledges the difficulties in enforcing the law, especially in coastal communities like Nyanyano, where illegal poaching is rampant.

“We’ve arrested people for poaching sea turtles before,” she told journalist Gideon Sarpong. “But it’s difficult to sustain these efforts without adequate time and logistics. We’ve been aware of the poaching in Nyanyano for months, but we haven’t been able to act on it due to lack of resources.”

Despite clear evidence of illegal poaching provided to her team during this investigation, no arrests have been made. Vivian’s frustration is palpable. “These are first-schedule animals. We should be prosecuting offenders, but without support, it’s hard to make a lasting impact,” she argued.

The challenge of enforcement, coupled with the economic realities of fishing communities, creates a perfect storm for the continued decline of sea turtles in Ghana. While officials like Vivian strive to uphold the law, traders like Essien, and the fishers who supply him, continue to operate with little fear of repercussions.

The 2020 report by the IUCN/SSC Marine Turtle Specialist Group reinforces the lack of action by Ghanaian authorities, noting that “regulation is rarely enforced beyond coastal communities that contain a Wildlife Division field office.”

The gap between legislation and enforcement leaves sea turtles in a vulnerable position, caught between survival and extinction.

The future of Ghana’s sea turtles

As the sun sets on the beaches of Nyanyano, the future of Ghana’s sea turtles remains uncertain. Dr. Agyekumhene remains hopeful that continuous community-based interventions can eventually turn the tide in favor of conservation. But without significant intervention, the outlook is grim.

So far, community driven projects by groups like the Environmental Justice Foundation, Ghana Turtle Conservation Project, Meridian Port Services geared towards protecting sea turtles offer a glimmer of hope.

“The future of our oceans depends on these creatures,” Dr. Agyekumhene warns. “If we lose the sea turtles, we risk losing everything else. It’s not just about them—it’s about the entire ecosystem.”

For now, the battle continues, with dedicated conservationists, struggling fishers, and illegal traders locked in a complex and fragile dance.

The survival of Ghana’s sea turtles, and the health of its coastal waters, hang in the balance, caught between the pressures of economic survival and the desperate need for environmental protection.

—-

This investigation is part of the Pulitzer Ocean Reporting Network Fellowship. Reporting and writing by Gideon Sarpong.

The post The vanishing guardians of Ghana’s oceans: Exposing the sea turtle poaching crisis appeared first on iWatch Africa.

In this investigation, Gideon Sarpong delves into the intricacies of the European Commission’s (EC) fishery policies, focusing on the Commission’s actions, or lack thereof, in West Africa. This complex web encompasses critical issues such as flag of convenience, the targeting and export of over exploited small pelagic fish by EU registered vessels flying the flag of Cameroon and the persistent challenge of IUU (Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated) fishing practices in West Africa.

BISSAU, Guinea-Bissau — Off the coast of West Africa, from Guinea Bissau to Mauritania, the sighting of the Pilot Whale vessel is a commonplace occurrence. This fishing ship, stretching 96 meters in length, is nearly as extensive as a 100-meter track.

This colossal vessel diligently hauls in significant quantities of small pelagic fish, particularly sardinella, mackerel, and sardines – that form the lifeblood of artisanal fishers in the region.

What is striking is the flag it flies – the vibrant green, red, and yellow emblem of Cameroon.

However, beyond this flag, there is very little that connects the Pilot Whale to Cameroon. In fact, this vessel, also known as Mikhail Verbitskiy, is just one example of many vessels uncovered during this investigation owned and operated by European-based companies accused of participating in IUU related activities while cleverly exploiting the concept of a “flag of convenience.”

In 2020, the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), an international organisation committed to monitoring economic and environmental abuses, designated Cameroon’s flag as a “flag of convenience.”

According to marine experts, this label is a tool used by unscrupulous operators to escape accountability for illegal fishing, human rights violations, and other crimes through the manipulation of vessel registrations.

EJF’s findings also revealed a disconcerting fact: more than half (55%) of the vessels in Cameroon’s fleet had been added in the last five years. Even more noteworthy, these new vessels constituted 90% of the fleet’s total tonnage, with 94% of these newcomers under foreign, non-Cameroonian ownership. Nearly all of them operated outside of Cameroon’s waters.

The “Red Card” and EC’s ‘Hypocritical’ Response

This concerning state of affairs led to the issuance of a “Red Card,” by the European Commission in January 2023. Central to this punitive action was the claim of “weak flag state control” which contributed to illegal fishing practices on an international scale.

In issuing the Red Card to Cameroon, the EC announced that, “Member States shall refuse the importation of fishery products from Cameroon even when accompanied by catch certificates,” effectively banning fish imports from the country. This measure took effect immediately following the Red Card’s issuance in January 2023.

In a surprising twist, the investigation uncovered a disquieting reality. Twelve vessels, owned, managed, or associated with companies tied to the European Union, continue to raise the flag of Cameroon.

What’s even more striking is, an analysis of trade data from the European Market Observatory for fisheries and aquaculture (EUMOFA) platform revealed that nearly €10 million worth of fish had entered the EU from Cameroon between January 2023 and September 2023, despite the ban imposed by the European Commission.

Astonishingly, the EC has yet to take any substantive actions against these companies and the continuous flow of fish from Cameroon into the EU market.

An official of the EU IUU Fishing Coalition stressed that these fishing vessels are able to take advantage of what the European Commission perceives as “Cameroon’s lax fisheries controls, while financial proceeds remain within the EU.”

Beatrice Gorez, the coordinator for the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements, a consortium of organizations committed to shedding light on the impacts of EU-African fisheries agreements, poignantly asks, “Should the European Union not also seek to target these European based companies?”

Unmasking EU Companies and the Cameroonian Illusion

In a disturbing revelation, the Ocean Whale Fishing Company, founded in 2016, has emerged as a shadowy player in the African fishing industry. Operating a fleet of five fishing vessels across the continent, Ocean Whale’s practices have raised eyebrows, as it exploits regulatory gaps and threatens West Africa’s small pelagic fish stocks, a lifeline for local artisanal fishers.

The company which owns the Pilot Whale purports to be a legitimate entity, officially registered in Malta under the registration number C76874. However, the investigation reveals that the company’s operations transcend borders, exposing an unsettling discrepancy between its registration and the scope of its activities.

What adds a layer of intrigue to this unfolding story is the peculiar choice of flags for its five industrial-sized vessels: the Right Whale, Pilot Whale, Sei Whale, Grey Whale, and the Crystal Hope. Despite operating well outside the boundaries of Cameroon, these vessels proudly fly the Cameroonian flag, sparking questions about the motivation behind such a choice.

The heart of this controversy lies in Ocean Whale’s voracious pursuit of small pelagic fish, a resource in grave peril in West African waters according to scientists. Among these fish stocks, sardinella holds a special place, cherished for its role as a traditional food source for West African communities.

Not only is it affordable and critical to food security in places like Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, but it also provides essential animal protein, micronutrients, and fatty acids for millions across the region.

AIS data analysed exposed Ocean Whale’s predatory fishing practices within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Namibia. These vessels plunder the very heart of West Africa’s maritime resources, disregarding scientific concerns about sustainability.

In October 2023, the Joint Scientific Committee, tasked with overseeing the implementation of the EU-Mauritania fisheries agreement issued a report that amounted to an indictment of EU fishing fleets in the West African region.

The report noted that the EU fleet fishing for small pelagic in West Africa, particularly the East European vessels, continue to “disregard their obligations to embark scientific observers on board,” while they fish unsustainably.

The small pelagic fish, known for their migratory patterns, traverse the EEZs of several West African states, creating a complex web of overfishing and exploitation.

Food and Agricultural Organisation data spanning several years, paints a grim picture of sardinella overexploitation in the regions where Ocean Whale Company operates. This alarming trend puts the delicate marine ecosystem on the brink of collapse, jeopardizing both local livelihoods and regional food security.

Fisheries expert Beatrice Gorez, a prominent voice in this investigation, raises a pertinent concern: “This is really a black spot in the European policy, because at the moment there is very little in terms of legislative tools for the EU to act against these vessels where the beneficial owners are still European but are taking the flag of another country.”

She further emphasized the need for the EC to take “decisive measures against EU-based individuals and companies that own or manage vessels engaged in unsustainable fishing practices in foreign territories.”

Gorez’s plea is underscored by the fact that in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and other West Africa states, there is a glaring “absence of proper regional management for small pelagic fish,” leaving the door open for “exploitative practices.” In her view, EU vessels, whether EU-flagged or under the Cameroon flag, should be prohibited from accessing these vulnerable waters.

As this investigation delves deeper, a disturbing pattern emerges, shedding light on the extent of the use of Cameroon’s flag as a “flag of convenience” by unscrupulous fishing operators.

In addition to Ocean Whale, data from the Global Fishing Watch (GFW) uncovered seven more fishing vessels that operate under the Cameroon flag while conducting their activities far beyond the nation’s territorial waters.

These vessels, identified as the Marshal Krylov, Marshal Vasilevskiy, Marshal Novikov, Vega (also Known As Skagen), Sveaborg, Helsingfors, and Frederickshamn (alternatively known as Fredrikshamn), have raised concerns about the exploitation of the Cameroonian flag for nefarious purposes.

The practice of using flags of convenience allows these operators to evade scrutiny and exploit regulatory gaps, creating a significant challenge for international efforts to monitor and regulate fishing activities said Beatrice Gorez.

The investigation unearthed a Latvian connection within this perplexing web of operations. The vessels Marshal Krylov, Marshal Vasilevskiy, and Marshal Novikov are currently owned by the Latvian company BALTREIDS (Oceanic Fisheries Nb). The origins of BALTREIDS trace back to the Soviet Union, further adding to the complexity of the situation.

It’s worth noting that BALTREIDS, like Ocean Whale, focuses on small pelagic fish in West African waters, particularly in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of countries like Mauritania. This overlaps with accusations of past IUU fishing-related activities in West Africa. Such allegations point to a disturbing trend of disregard for environmental and regulatory norms in these critical fishing grounds.

Satellite data from Equasis provides insight into the recent movements of the MARSHAL KRYLOV and MARSHAL VASILEVSKIY. Their last port call was recorded in Mauritania in October 2023, indicating their ongoing presence and activities in West African waters.

The remaining ships, Sveaborg, Helsingfors, and Fredrikshamn, are listed as being owned by Camelford, Mont Albert, and Langwarrin, respectively, all of which are companies based in Cyprus, according to GFW data. The last vessel, Vega, was previously owned by Bovina Limited, also a Cyprus-based entity, but is presently controlled by Pescado in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Ocean Whale Company and other involved entities failed to respond to our requests for comment.

Dr. Aristide Takoukam, a dedicated conservationist and the founder of the African Marine Mammal Conservation Organization (AMMCO), characterized the actions of these large fishing vessels operating in the EZZ of West Africa as having “detrimental and destructive economic ramifications.” He pointed out that the intrusion of some large foreign vessels into areas designated for local fishermen leads to “conflicts, as these vessels target the primary livelihood of artisanal fishermen, thereby jeopardizing food security.”

SFPAs & Export of overfished Small Pelagic to Europe

The EU currently operates several Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) or bilateral fishing agreement that allows EU vessels to fish in the EEZ of third countries. It currently holds 11 active agreements with countries across Africa including Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau which sets out fish access limits in exchange for financial contribution.

All European vessels, whether operating under SFPAs or private agreements, are subject to the stringent regulations outlined in the SMEFF (Sustainable Management of External Fishing Fleets) framework. This framework mandates sustainable fishing practices.

However, the situation takes a curious turn when it comes to Cameroon-flagged trawlers. These vessels can potentially exceed the EU-imposed limits without being required to offload their catches in Mauritania or Guinea-Bissau.

A report by IUU Watch reveals a concerning trend among vessel owners who opt for Flags of Convenience. Such choices appear to prioritize gaining access to a multitude of countries’ EEZs with little regard for sustainable fishing practices and accountability.

The report noted: “In the case of EU vessels, abusive reflagging may occur to circumvent the exclusivity clause set out in official EU access agreements with non-EU countries (SFPAs). According to this exclusivity clause, EU flagged fishing vessels are not permitted to operate in the waters of the non-EU country in which an SFPA is in force unless they hold a fishing authorisation which has been issued in accordance with that agreement.”

“This practice undermines the very essence of the SMEFF regulations, endangering marine ecosystems and the livelihoods of local communities,” said an EU official speaking on condition of anonymity.

The investigation also exposed a disconcerting paradox in the EC’s import policies. Despite a ban on importing fishery products from Cameroon, close to €10 million worth of these products found their way into various EU countries by September 2023.

This unsettling data, drawn from the EUMOFA platform, drew scrutiny from the EC, which contested the figure. The Commission admitted that fishery products from Cameroon entered the union in 2023, albeit in very small quantities. However, when investigators requested for the data to substantiate their claim, an official from the EC failed to provide it.

The EC’s argument hinged on the claim that these imports fell outside the scope of their “catch certification scheme,” citing examples like “oysters and ornamental fish” which it argued was “mainly imported by France and Belgium.”

Further analysis of fishery export data from EUMOFA revealed another startling revelation. Fish worth over €150 million comprising overfished species like small pelagic had entered the EU from Mauritania and Guinea Bissau as at September 2023.

In response to this investigation, the EC’s spokesperson invoked Article 17 of the IUU (Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated) Regulation, which empowers EU Member States to implement verification procedures when importing fishery products.

The spokesperson argued that, “the Commission is “supporting the effective implementation of the catch certification scheme by the Member States through the development of IT CATCH, an IT system aiming at digitalising catch certification data and harmonising procedures.

An audit of the current EU CATCH controls showed that the “measures in place to combat illegal fishing are only partly effective,” with the reduced effectiveness attributed to the inconsistent application of inspections and penalties by Member States.

Government officials in both Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau did not immediately respond to a message requesting comment.

Voices of struggle amidst ecological decline, Path Forward

The far-reaching implications of this ecological crisis extend well beyond the ocean’s shores, permeating the lives of local communities.

During a meeting with EU parliamentarians in June 2023, Antónia Adama Djaló, Vice President of the African Confederation of Artisanal Fisheries Organisations, made a compelling argument. She emphasized, “All too often, our decision-makers and their partners fail to take action and neglect our needs.”

“On paper, our governments and the international community express support for us, however, their actions frequently prioritize the interests of sectors promising significant short-term financial gains, such as industrial fishing, mining, gas exploitation, and coastal tourism” she said.

“This threatens the future of our communities. The time for words is over.”

In the heart of these hardships are the individuals who directly depend on the sea for their livelihoods, and their voices speak volumes about the challenges they face.

Abdoulaye Kaba, a 35-year-old resident of Bissau, expressed his profound frustration, revealing, “The biggest challenge has been the last decade. We only get a handful of catch after toiling for several hours at sea.”

He emphasized that the once-lucrative profession of artisanal fishing had lost its economic appeal, a stark testament to the magnitude of the crisis.

For local fishmongers, predominantly women, the struggle is no less dire. Juliet Efemena, a fish processor in her 30s, articulated her anguish, saying, “It gets worse and worse every year. All our fish is stolen by the big vessels. We do not know what to do.”

Their poignant words paint a picture of despair as they grapple with the relentless encroachment of industrial fishing on their traditional way of life.

Guinea Bissau’s plight in the face of this declining fish stock is underscored by its disheartening performance in the 2021 IUU Fishing Index. The country found itself among the ten worst-performing nations, failing to uphold critical transparency and discrimination clauses within its SFPAs with the European Commission. This does not only reflect systemic deficiencies in the management of its fisheries but also poses a grave threat to the well-being of its citizens.

Fisheries expert Beatrice Gorez outlines a potential path forward through the implementation of the ministerial statement by the Organization of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States. This statement calls on countries involved to “collect information about beneficial owners of the vessels they flag in the country.”

By taking this step, nations can foster greater accountability and sustainability in the fishing industry, a move long overdue she argued.

However, her critique of the European Commission’s current transparency efforts is uncompromising. She characterizes them as “opaque and cosmetic,” stressing that the crucial initial step in countering Flags of Convenience is the creation of a “European register of beneficial owners for fishing companies that is publicly accessible.”

Juliet Efemena and fishmongers like her, whose lives are intricately linked to the sea, may not be well-versed in the complexities of the broader fisheries policies, but their message is crystal clear. In her words, “we simply need our fish to provide for our families.”

The urgency of their appeal serves as a stark reminder of the need for immediate and decisive action to protect both their traditional way of life and the fragile marine ecosystem on which it depends.

Report by Gideon Sarpong, Pulitzer Ocean Reporting Fellow.

The post The Dark Seas of Deception:Unmasking EU fisheries in West Africa’s troubled waters appeared first on iWatch Africa.

This investigation also puts the spotlight on the plantation giant’s disconcerting role as a rubber supplier to European tire manufacturers, including French-based Michelin raising critical concerns about its existing associations with deforestation and human rights violations in West Africa.

Okumu, Nigeria – Okumu Oil Palm Company, a subsidiary under the umbrella of the Socfin Group, possesses an extensive 7,335-hectare rubber plantation and a sprawling 19,062-hectare palm plantation, all nestled within the Ovia South-West local government area of Edo State.

The company’s presence in the Okumu community has become a contentious issue, notably for the indigenous people, including children who have endured displacement due to the company’s activities.

In 2021, the Socfin Group reported a remarkable profit of 80.4 million euros, its highest figure since at least 2014 due to increasing prices for palm oil and rubber. Yet, paradoxically, the Okumu community and other host communities throughout West Africa remain a stark contrast to the image of prosperity associated with Socfin’s substantial export earnings.

Human Rights Abuses

In a deeply distressing account of events, residents of Okumu have leveled accusations against the company for forcibly dismantling three villages within the district, namely—Lemon, Agbeda, and Oweike.

This action resulted in the displacement of hundreds of indigenous inhabitants and the grim aftermath of community farmland destruction, loss of life, and the disruption of children’s education.

For many of these people, their roots run deep within these villages, with no kin beyond the boundaries of their home. The repercussions of the company’s actions continue to haunt the affected communities, even decades after the devastation was wrought.

Today, Lemon, once a thriving community, has been reduced to a mere memory, while the residents of Oweike and Agbeda have been compelled to relocate to nearby communities, seeking refuge and new beginnings.

Upon closer examination, our investigation unveiled a disconcerting narrative: following the eviction of these three communities, the company proceeded to expand its palm and rubber plantations, acquiring a staggering 1,969 hectares of oil palm and 1,811 hectares of rubber in the process.

According to the company’s own website, these expansions represent only a fraction of their broader growth trajectory, with an astounding total of 33,112 hectares now under their purview.

The story of Austin Lemon, a mere 15 years old at the time Socfin’s presence descended upon his community, serves as a heart-wrenching testament to the trauma endured by these communities. As he watched the Luxembourger company, accompanied by security personnel, lay waste to his ancestral home, he also witnessed the pleas of his parents and fellow Lemon village residents in Okomu.

They implored the company to allow them to remain, as they had no alternative haven. Regrettably, their appeals fell on deaf ears, as Socfin’s relentless pursuit of rubber and palm resources took precedence.

His father, the founder of Lemon Village in 1969 and the namesake of the community, followed the age-old Nigerian customary law, which dictates that the first person to settle on a virgin land gains rightful ownership.

Lemon, who is now 33, recalls the profound “shock” that gripped his father, the respected leader of Lemon village within the Okumu community, upon learning that Socfin had acquired their ancestral home. In a desperate bid to secure some semblance of justice for his fellow villagers in the face of impending displacement, Lemon’s father implored the company to provide compensation for their relocation but that did not happen.

He ruefully reflects, “The Company planted their plantation without heeding to their pleas.” The consequences were catastrophic – every single house in Lemon village met its demise, and the once-thriving areas reserved for the cultivation of plantain, cassava, cocoa, and cocoyam were reduced to ruins.

Lemon’s personal account of these events is a poignant reminder of the human cost inflicted by the company’s actions. He reveals, “For a whole year, I couldn’t attend school because we were displaced and struggling to make ends meet.”

“It was the company’s actions that ultimately led to the death of my father, who had high blood pressure. He perished because the farms he once relied upon to feed his 32 children were also obliterated,” he revealed.

In a surprising turn of events, the company denied the findings presented to them.

According to Socfin’s communications team, they acquired their plantation following the de-reservation of a portion of Okomu Forest Reserve by Nigeria’s federal government, in compliance with the Edo Forestry Commission Law (1968) and its subsequent amendments, among other relevant legislation.

Nevertheless, Ajele Sunday, a spokesperson for the Okumu community, contradicts the company’s account. He asserts that the community “never received any compensation” when Socfin claimed to have procured the land from the government.

Multiple sources within the Okomu village have raised concerns, contending that the company conducted negotiations with the government without seeking or taking into consideration the community’s perspective.

This apparent lack of consultation with the community “directly contradicts the principles outlined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, particularly the concept of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC),” Ajele argued.

This breach raises critical concerns about the treatment of indigenous communities and their rights in the context of corporate activities, shedding light on the urgency of adhering to these vital principles.

According to FPIC, Indigenous Peoples possess the right to grant or withhold consent for projects that stand to impact them or their territories.

A Tragic Fight for Freedom in Okomu Village

In 2022, Socfin (Okumu Oil Palm Company) took a contentious step by excavating a large trench around its plantation, effectively barricading the community, leaving residents stranded with no access to the outside world. During the rainy season, the runoff from this trench, laden with fertilizers, contaminated the Okomu River, the sole source of drinking water, and proved fatal to fish in the water. Frustrated by this environmental degradation, the residents organized a peaceful protest at the company’s entrance, demanding the closure of the trench.

The protests had spanned two days, with the first day devoted to demonstrations within the community. On the second day, the residents decided to take their grievances to the company’s gate. En route, they were intercepted by security officers determined to quell the protest.

Among the protesters, Iyabo Batu, aged 56, found herself at the forefront. On May 3, 2022, while demonstrating against the company’s closure of the sole road leading to her village, Marhiaoba, she was struck by a bullet in the knee, believed to have been fired by a Socfin security personnel.

“It was very difficult for my grandchildren to go to school because the white man blocked the road,” Iyabo Batu explained, referring to the Socfin manager. She went on to describe how the road closure, a consequence of the trench excavated by the company, led to children in the village discontinuing their schooling. This was the sole route in and out of the community, now obstructed by the company’s actions.

The peaceful protest turned tragic when security personnel attached to the company targeted Iyabo Batu, shooting her in the knee. She was swiftly transported to a clinic before being transferred to the general hospital of Igbuobazua headquarters. Her hospitalization extended beyond a month following the surgery for her gunshot wound, but she expressed her deep sadness at the fact that the company had neither covered her medical expenses nor offered their sympathy.

The company denied any involvement in the incident, insisting that no employee had shot Mrs. Batu. However, community spokesperson Sunday, among others, claimed that the company was attempting to distance itself from the actions.

Iyabo Batu’s X-ray results unveiled multiple patella fractures, and she credited Environmental Rights Actions (ERA) for her survival. Rita Ukwa of ERA disclosed that they supported Batu, including arranging a city apartment for her for a year after her hospital discharge, as evidenced by her hospital discharge receipt, indicating a payment of 226,940 naira[$296] to the Benin Teaching Hospital.

The company, in responding to findings of this investigation, asserted that they were unable to comment on the allegations as no “formal complaint had been filed by the alleged complainant, either to the company or the Nigerian Police Force.” They also clarified that their security personnel “were not permitted to carry weapons, as per government regulations.”

However, multiple witnesses, both within and outside the company, contended that a company security officer was indeed responsible for the shooting of 59-year-old Iyabo Batu. A non-Okomu resident working for the company identified the officer in question as a government anti-terrorism officer. The source chose to remain anonymous out of fear, considering the potential repercussions from either the company or the police officers who delayed recording the community’s statement when Mrs. Batu was rushed to the police station.

Our investigations showed that the security apparatus for Okumu Oil Palm Company comprises police, private security, and military officers, even though they are compensated by the federal government. These officers are also subject to the directives of the company, raising questions about the dynamics of power and accountability in this complex relationship.

 A spokesperson for Edo State Chris Osa Nehikhare said, “the government will also monitor what is happening in Okomu to ensure no one is exploited and to make life better for the community,”

Plantation Socfinaf Ghana and Deforestation

Meanwhile in Ghana, the operations of Plantation Socfinaf Ghana (PSG), a subsidiary of the Socfin Group which operates rubber and oil palm plantations in Manso and Daboase in the Western Region has led to the destruction of vital rainforests.

In 2017 and 2018, PSG contracted Proforest and HS+E respectively to conduct environmental assessments at its Subri site in Daboase ahead of the construction of a palm processing mill in 2019.

Findings from this assessment showed that any large-scale operations at the Subri site would result in the “loss of biodiversity, land degradation, increase in ambient noise levels, aerial emissions and the destruction of unique endangered ecosystems and species within the catchment areas.”

Notably, the Proforest assessment emphasized the substantial environmental value of the PSG Subri site. It was found to host a substantial “carbon stock of 981,080.74 metric tons” and served as a crucial “habitat for a vulnerable population of species” in need of conservation measures. Despite these findings, PSG proceeded with the construction of the palm processing mill in in 2020 costing US$20 million.

PSG also admitted that between 2012 and 2016, over 1 089 ha of natural forests were cleared to make way for its plantations failing to heed to concerns by environmental groups.

Despite mounting concerns and inquiries into PSG’s actions, the company has remained conspicuously silent, failing to respond to our requests for information regarding their mitigation plans and the repercussions of their operations on the communities around Daboase and the environment at large.

Data from Global Forest Watch paints a distressing picture of the situation. Between 2001 and 2022, Ghana’s Western Region witnessed the loss of a staggering 536,000 hectares of tree cover. This represents a 23% decline in tree cover since the turn of the millennium, accompanied by a grim emission of 297 million metric tons of CO₂ equivalent. It’s worth noting that this region, the wettest in Ghana, plays host to PSG’s extensive plantations.

The ramifications of this ecological decline extend beyond the boundaries of forests and into the lives of the local communities. Farmers like Godwin Ofori, a 35-year-old resident of Daboase in close proximity to PSG’s plantation, have borne the brunt of these changes.

Mr. Ofori expressed his frustration with the evolving rainfall patterns, stating, “One of the biggest challenges over the last decade has been unpredictable rainfall patterns. We cannot predict the rainfall pattern nowadays, and I believe that this is partly a destruction of our forests.”

Recent study by researchers at University of Leeds has shown that African tropical forests remain critical to the fight against the climate emergency, absorbing three times more carbon each year than the UK emitted in 2019.

The direct link between the decline in critical rainforests and these erratic weather patterns underlines the adverse impact on the livelihoods and food security of those living in the vicinity.

Startling findings from Global Witness showcase the unsettling consequence of industrial rubber plantations across the expanse of West and Central Africa, witnessing the loss of nearly 52,000 hectares of ecologically rainforest since the turn of the century—equivalent to an expanse 16 times the size of Brussels.

EU, Deforestation and Rubber companies

In June 2023, the EU introduced regulations on deforested products to address the challenge of rubber and oil plantation-driven deforestation. The EU remains the biggest export destination for palm oil and rubber cultivation from West Africa. Data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity shows that the EU imported over $500 million worth of natural rubber from West Africa in 2020 alone making natural rubber the EU’s most significant import from West Africa in terms of rainforest destruction.

The effect has been the loss of critical rainforests, with a damning impact on local communities, biodiversity, and the environment. This new law has the potential to put a check on Socfin’s operations across West Africa.

Colin Robertson, a Senior Forests Investigator at Global Witness lauded EU efforts describing it as a “very promising step towards reducing European consumers’ impact on the world’s forests.”

He however cautioned that “the inclusion of rubber should mean that European tire manufacturers will have to check that the rubber plantations they buy from are sticking firmly to zero deforestation pledges.”

Based on detailed export data examined, our investigation unearthed a direct link between Société des Matières Premières Tropicales PTE and the procurement of natural rubber from Okomu Oil Palm Company over the last two years.

Société des Matières Premières Tropicales PTE functions as the sole consolidated purchaser of natural rubber for tire manufacturing giant, the Michelin Group. This revelation gives rise to profound ethical concerns, casting a shadow on the European tire manufacturing industry’s dedication to fostering sustainability.

In response to our investigation, the Michelin Group acknowledged our findings and affirmed their awareness of “historical grievances expressed by local communities” against Okomu Oil Palm Company, insisting that they have closely monitored the situation since 2015.

“In collaboration with a civil society organization, we urged Socfin to enhance its sustainable development performance, which eventually led to Socfin’s adoption of “zero deforestation” and “non-exploitation” commitments,” Michelin wrote in their response.

However, our findings expose a crucial discrepancy: Socfin’s interpretation of “zero deforestation” does not align with the industry-recognized standard known as the High Carbon Stock Approach (HCSA). Neither Socfin nor its subsidiaries across West Africa are members of the HCSA. This incongruity highlights the urgent need for greater clarity and alignment within the industry.

Greenpeace has sounded a resounding alarm, cautioning that Socfin’s steadfast resistance to adopting the industry’s zero-deforestation standard poses a significant and looming threat to the forests of West Africa, where the company’s operations are concentrated.

The future of these critical ecosystems remains at a crossroads, demanding enhanced vigilance and rigorous commitment to sustainable practices.

——

Reporting by Gideon Sarpong, Elfredah Kevin-Alerechi and Audrey Travère. Writing and Editing by Gideon Sarpong.

This report is supported by JournalismFund Europe.

The post Socfin exploitation of rubber & palm oil linked to deforestation & human rights abuses in Ghana & Nigeria appeared first on iWatch Africa.

DIBOMBARI, Cameroon — “We are going through hell,” the haunting words of Marie Noel resonate with a mix of despair and fortitude. Marie, an activist in her 50s hailing from the village of Souza near Dibombari Socapalm Plantation, paints a somber portrait of her community’s plight. Amidst the cruel grip of hardship, they’ve been driven to the brink, forced to scavenge “Socapalm fruits and nuts” in a desperate bid to quell their gnawing hunger.

In 2006, Société Camerounaise de Palmeraies (Socapalm), a subsidiary of plantation giant, Socfin, embarked on an ambitious endeavor – the cultivation of palm plantations within Dibombari’s lush rainforest expanse in Cameroon. Yet, beneath the veneer of progress lies a tapestry of troubling accusations. Allegations of forcible land displacement, pollution of vital water sources, the decimation of delicate ecosystems, and the sacrilegious intrusion into ancestral lands cast a dark shadow over the company’s operations.

A three-month investigation conducted by Gideon Sarpong and Robert Abunaw puts the spotlight on these unsettling truths. At the core of this narrative looms a protracted legal clash waged in French courts – Sherpa et al. vs Socfin. This ten-year legal drama, ostensibly conceived to quell the quagmire of land conflicts, ecological turmoil, and the cries of the aggrieved, paradoxically seems to amplify the existing travails of these marginalized communities. Thousands, bereft of their means of livelihood, have been forced into the murky realm of petty criminality within the very bowels of Socapalm’s sprawling plantations – a bitter struggle for survival in the face of adversity.

Marie Noel placed the blame squarely on the government of Cameroon and Socfin, accusing the state of leasing all their precious farmlands to the multinational plantation company, and its local subsidiaries.

In her words, this decision has left the neighboring villagers with “nothing, as all their lands have been locked up in a 60-year lease to Socapalm.”

Despite all the controversies, the Socapalm plantation site situated in Dibombari secured a Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) certification in 2022. This certification is widely considered a mark of sustainable and environmentally conscious production, indicating that the site adheres to the lowest possible environmental impact standards.

However, a review of a July 2023 EarthWorm Foundation (EF) report, commissioned by none other than Socfin, casts a long shadow over the company concerning its Dibombari operations. The report confirmed accusations of severe improprieties, including the denial of livelihoods and land displacements, sexual harassment of local communities, water pollution resulting in a lack of access to clean drinking water, and the encroachment of sacred sites by the company’s sprawling plantations.

These findings, which are consistent with our own reporting, raise significant concerns about the RSPO certification granted to Socapalm’s Dibombari site. With documented instances of several cases of abuse, many are left wondering how the company managed to obtain its RSPO certification despite seemingly falling short of meeting crucial international regulations.

Mr. Emmanuel Elong, the president of SYNAPARCAM, a Cameroonian association defending the indigenous rights of local communities, expressed deep bewilderment over the continued granting of RSPO certifications to Socapalm.

“In the face of overwhelming evidence of misconduct and questionable practices, there are mounting questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the RSPO certification process,” he argued.

In response to this investigation, RSPO contented that “Socapalm Dibombari’s operating unit underwent an audit by the independent third-party certification body, BSI Services Malaysia Sdn. Bhd, who granted certification.”

RSPO further explained that it has “reviewed the EF report against the audit conducted by BSI and will advise BSI to review and verify the findings of the EF investigation. At their discretion, BSI will further investigate/verify those reports/issues/allegations via an additional audit or during its annual surveillance audit.”

The implications of these findings shed light on the ongoing challenges faced by the affected communities, raising urgent questions about the responsibility of both corporate entities and the government to protect the rights and well-being of their citizens.

Laura Bourgeois, Advocacy and Litigation officer for Sherpa, an international NGO dedicated to advocacy and litigation, notes: “The recurring problems we hear from community leaders on the frontline is that community members, stakeholders, are not included in the process and that the certification initiatives make the problems even worse.”

A Decade of Legal Strife and Its Unfolding Impact

Socfin in August 2023 released an action plan to address the findings of Earthworm’s report.

However, considering the company’s track record in Cameroon, skepticism arises among many regarding their commitment to follow through on these claims.

A representative for Socapalm declined to comment on this investigation, pointing to information available on Socfin’s official website.

In 2013, Sherpa initiated mediation with Bolloré, the majority owner of Socfin, to find resolutions to the persistent issues plaguing the plantations and their surroundings. This dialogue culminated in an action plan, where Bolloré pledged to leverage their influence to tackle these problems.

Yet, despite the agreed-upon plan, Bolloré failed to fulfill its commitments, prompting Sherpa and other organizations to initiate legal proceedings against the French multinational. A decade-long courtroom saga ensued, adding a further layer of complexity to the challenges endured by communities ensnared in Socapalm’s operational embrace.

“The non-implementation of the action plan agreed upon in 2013 confirms it is an absolute necessity, when possible, to have mandatory legislation in the field of business and human rights,” asserts Laura Bourgeois. She adds: “Otherwise, soft mechanisms mean that communities remain dependent upon the goodwill of companies. When mandatory legislation does not seem like an option, it seems appropriate to consider legal avenues to harden soft law.”

This legal battle in the French courts to compel the execution of the action plan, and to ensure the delivery of promised remedies, has aggravated the already dire challenges faced by some communities within the operational sphere of Socapalm.

In Kilombo, a village that is situated at the heart of Socapalm Kienke plantation in Cameroon, Yengue Jean’s frustration with the company is palpable. She characterized the company as “irresponsible” and went on to reveal that a borehole, ostensibly installed to benefit the village, was “primarily utilized to irrigate the adjacent Socapalm nursery.”

Jean lamented, “The residents are now compelled to depend on a nearby stream tainted with pollutants,” while sorrowfully noting, “Our once thriving forests have vanished, leaving us without the vital resources to sustain our traditional hunting practices.”

Deforestation and the new European Union (EU) Law

Startling findings from Global Witness showcase the unsettling consequence of industrial palm and rubber plantations across the expanse of West and Central Africa, witnessing the loss of nearly 52,000 hectares of ecologically rainforest since the turn of the century—equivalent to an expanse 16 times the size of Brussels.

A 2021 study led by Cameroonian researcher Professor Tchindjang Mesmin also revealed that palm oil cultivation in the dense forest regions of Cameroon has emerged as the principal catalyst behind deforestation since the year 1990.

In a sharp critique, Mr. Elong blamed the government of Cameroon for its perceived failure to tackle crucial issues, alleging that the administration displays “worrisome indications of corruption,”, especially in the enforcement of retrocession agreements between Socfin and the State.

Cameroon’s Minister of Environment and Protection of Nature, Pierre Hélé did not respond to our requests for comment.

In June 2023, the EU introduced regulations on deforested products to address the challenge of rubber and oil plantation-driven deforestation,

The EU remains the biggest export destination for palm oil and rubber cultivation from West Africa. Data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity shows that the EU imported over $500 million worth of natural rubber from West Africa in 2020 making natural rubber the EU’s most significant import from West Africa in terms of rainforest destruction.

The effect has been the loss of critical rainforests, with a damning impact on local communities, biodiversity, and the environment.

Dr. Addo Koranteng, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Research Innovation and Development in Ghana lauded the EU’s legislative action against deforestation.

Nonetheless, his commendation is accompanied by a stark warning: “The expansion of rubber plantations must be halted as these rubber-producing trees compete with other forest trees for the already depleted forest land.”

Dr. Koranteng’s concerns are underscored by an inconvenient truth: “As world market prices surge and global demand exacerbate, the extent of deforestation from these commodities will keep on increasing,” he explained.

Recent research compounds the urgency of the situation. Estimates project a need for an astounding 4.3 to 8.5 million hectares of new plantations to meet the mounting demand for natural rubber by the year 2024. Experts are ringing alarm bells, cautioning that this trajectory, if left unchecked, will unleash a cataclysmic toll on precious forests around the world.

So far, our investigation has revealed a notable absence: Neither Socfin nor its Cameroon-based subsidiaries currently have made any commitment to the High Carbon Stock Approach (HCSA), the de-facto standard for zero deforestation in the sector.

Greenpeace has sounded a dire warning, asserting that Socfin’s steadfast refusal to adopt a zero-deforestation policy poses an ominous and substantial threat to the forests of Cameroon, within which the company operates.

Socfin did not respond to email inquiries seeking comment.

Way Forward

A decade-long saga of legal battles in French courts has so far yielded little solace for the numerous villagers residing in proximity to Socapalm plantations.

For these villagers whose ancestral lands have been lost to the expansive reach of Socapalm’s plantations, the passage of time has failed to bring about the restitution they so desperately seek.

“The plight we face is beyond words – a dire and miserable reality,” said villagers from Bikondo and Lendi.

There is however a glimmer of hope as legal practitioner, Agboranyor Jeniffer, with a wealth of expertise in Cameroon’s Common Law and Administrative Court, believes there might be a viable solution on the horizon.

Peering into the intricacies of Prime Ministerial Decree No. 2022/5074PM, she points out a potential avenue: the possibility of initiating legal action against the Government of Cameroon. She cites Section 2(3) of Law No. 2006/022, enacted on December 29, 2006, which lays down the framework for the organization and operation of administrative courts in Cameroon.

“Under this legal framework, the court’s jurisdiction extends to pivotal matters including, but not limited to; claims for compensation due to losses caused by administrative actions and disputes centered around state-owned land,” she explained.

Jeniffer’s analysis offers a flicker of optimism for those who have long grappled with the repercussions of Socapalm’s operations.

As the legal landscape continues to evolve, these insights may hold the potential to redress grievances, foster justice, and pave the way for meaningful change in the lives of the affected communities.

Reporting by Gideon Sarpong and Robert Abunaw. Writing and editing by Gideon Sarpong.

The post Whispers of Injustice: Socfin’s decade of legal battle echoing in communities across Cameroon appeared first on iWatch Africa.

From the outset, the minister faced fierce criticism from industry stakeholders, who dismissed her as ill-suited for the job. Her mettle was tested when just a few months into her tenure in 2021, the European Commission (EC) issued a ‘yellow card’ warning to Ghana.

The warning was an indictment of Ghana’s fishing practices, citing rampant illegal targeting of juvenile pelagic species and glaring deficiencies in the monitoring and control of the fishing fleet. The EC expressed concerns that fish caught through IUU fishing might find their way onto the European market.

The minister in her address conceded that Ghana’s small pelagic fish stock and marine resources were in a state of severe “overexploitation” as a result of IUU fishing practices.

Artisanal fishers however continue to complain that the “minister is only paying lip service” to the problem and has not demonstrated enough commitment to addressing the challenges.

The small pelagic fish comprising anchovies, mackerel, and sardines is popularly referred to as the ‘people’s fish’ in Ghana because of its importance to the local economy; directly employing over a million artisanal fishers and women in the value chain combined.

This fish stock which is the reserve of artisanal fishers has significantly reduced over the years. In 2020, the Sustainable Fisheries Management research revealed that despite increasing fishing efforts by the artisanal fishing fleet in Ghana’s waters, small pelagic fish catch has fallen by over 85 percent, from the peak in reported landings of 138,955 metric tonnes recorded in 1996.

Scientists have warned that Ghana’s small pelagic stock teeters on the edge of collapse with a significant impact on 2.7 million people who rely on the marine fisheries for survival.

Despite these alarming conditions of the small pelagic stock in Ghana, an investigation by iWatch Africa’s Gideon Sarpong found that over €40 million worth of the fish stock were exported to the European Union (EU) market in 2020 and 2021, with no export restrictions in place to protect the overfished species.

Additionally, the investigation revealed that the European Commission, which had issued a warning to Ghana, failed to implement restrictions on industrial vessels and companies engaged in IUU fishing activities, even though the EU fishery law permitted such action. These findings raise significant questions about the level of commitment by both Ghana and the EU toward protecting the sustainability of the small pelagic fish in Ghana.

Ghana’s minister of fisheries Hawa Koomson failed to respond to the findings of this investigation and our requests for comment.

Exporting fish from Ghana to the EU – Broken system?

In Ghana, the Fisheries Ministry is responsible for issuing catch certification licenses for fish export to the EU market, said Misornu Yaw Logo, a fisheries expert, with the fisheries ministry in Ghana.

The certification process is part of the Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS), which is an important system that monitors and verifies the origin of harvested fish and guarantees that they are caught in a sustainable manner in line with local and international regulations, he explained.

However, data provided by Ghana’s ministry indicated that the country exported almost $200 million worth of fish in 2020 and 2021, with 90% going to the EU market, while EU fisheries data recorded over €250 million ($269 million) in fish imports from Ghana during the same period, raising concerns about data inconsistencies.

Ghana’s fisheries ministry could not provide the data requested on small pelagic fish exported to the EU as part of this investigation, but the EU recorded over €40 million in import of small pelagic fish from Ghana.

Mr. Logo revealed that Ghana’s certification system has significant flaws, arguing that the catch documentation system “does not comprehensively prevent the export of endangered species.” According to his research conducted in 2022, there exists a discrepancy in the CDS procedure between Tuna vessels and trawler vessels in Ghana.

Mr. Logo’s research uncovered that tuna vessels undergo stringent checks as part of the CDS procedure in Ghana. Upon landing, the tuna vessel’s certificates are sent to two units at the ministry: the “Monitoring and Control Surveillance Unit and Fisheries Scientific Survey Division for further examination, ensuring data accuracy and compliance with both national and international regulations,” he noted.

In contrast, trawler operators bypass these additional checks and proceed “directly to the Catch Certification Unit of the ministry (a unit under Ghana’s fisheries ministry)” to prepare their consignment for export.

Dr. Edwin Kelly Ofori-Ani, the board secretary of the Ghana Industrial Trawlers Association (GITA), echoed Mr. Logo’s concerns emphasizing the “absence of a mechanism within the fisheries commission to determine real-time value of fish exported out of the country.”

He regarded the figures provided by the ministry as highly “deceptive” and called for greater transparency.

“The volumes are not accurate, and the values are under-declared,” he said.

As part of industrial trawlers’ self-regulatory efforts, Dr. Ofori-Ani proposed that the association itself “validates the catch return” before it is submitted to the fisheries commission for export.

EU failure to sanction companies engaged in IUU.

Over the years, several industrial trawlers not authorized to target small pelagic fish in Ghana have been arrested for deliberately targeting this fish stock in significant quantities causing severe overfishing and depletion of fish stock reserved for artisanal fishers.

One such vessel, the Lu Rong Yuan Yu 956, beneficiary owned by Chinese company Rongcheng Ocean Fishery, was re-arrested in Ghanaian waters in 2020 for illegally targeting small pelagic fish using under-size nets.

The actions of these trawlers have sparked concern and outrage among experts and researchers.

Dr. Isaac Okyere, a respected researcher at the University of Cape Coast, describes the dire situation, stating, “The small pelagic fish they catch is no longer treated as by-catch. Instead, it has become the primary target, while demersal fish has been relegated to by-catch status.”

This inversion of the fishing hierarchy has had devastating consequences for the local ecosystem and the livelihoods of artisanal fishers.

Documents obtained as part of this investigation revealed that two fishing vessels: the Lu Rong Yuan Yu 928 and Lu Rong Yuan Yu 907 beneficially owned by Rongcheng Ocean Fishery had been involved in fishing violations in the first quarter of 2023 and had been fined 90,000 cedis ($8100) by the regulators in Ghana.

Investigators also discovered that as of 2022, Rongcheng Ocean Fishery had authorization from the EU to export fish products to their markets.

In 2020, a report by Environmental Justice Foundation, an NGO that monitors economic and environmental abuses revealed multiple cases in which trawl vessels authorised to export to the EU were involved in illegal activities in Ghana.

Despite these illegalities and the extensive legal powers granted to the European Commission to combat IUU fishing by sanctioning third-country vessels, an official from the European Commission responded to the investigation, emphasizing the preference for “dialogue with countries, particularly the Republic of Ghana,” rather than taking direct action against specific companies.

This response has left many questioning the efficacy of the EU’s approach to combating IUU fishing.

As the biggest “market for seafood caught by the Ghana-flagged trawl fleet, EU consumers are inadvertently supporting illegal practices and severe overfishing in Ghana’s waters,” the report by the Environmental Justice Foundation concluded. 

The EU official went on to emphasize the importance of the catch certification scheme as a crucial tool in the fight against IUU fishing.

However, in light of numerous criticisms directed towards the EU catch scheme, Steve Trent, CEO of the Environmental Justice Foundation is advocating for “a risk-based approach to seafood inspections to keep out imports linked to illegal fishing, human rights abuses or the destruction of ocean ecosystems.”

Trent went on to suggest that “Imports to the EU from the Chinese-owned trawl fleet operating in Ghana should certainly be regarded as high risk, closely scrutinized and, if any evidence of illegal fishing is found, refused entry.”

Impact on Fishers, & ineffective penalties & regulatory oversight

Francis Adam, President of the Central Region Fishermen, expressed deep concern over the continued neglect of calls for reform in Ghana’s fisheries sector, despite the “yellow card” warning issued by the European Union (EU).

Adam highlighted the alarming decline in catches by artisanal fishers in the country, making the last decade particularly most challenging.

Reflecting on his three decades in the fishing business, Adam expressed his frustration about the dramatic reduction in catches, emphasizing the “absurdity” of the “absence of export restrictions for their fish.”

“Everybody is allowed to target our fish, without serious consequences. This is ridiculous,” he said.

Currently, more than 200 coastal villages in Ghana rely on fishing as their primary source of income exacerbating the gravity of the situation. According to the World Bank, the average annual income per artisanal canoe has plummeted by up to 40% in the past decade, plunging thousands of fishers and their dependents into abject poverty.

Adding to the complexity of the issue, many companies in Ghana possessing export licenses can freely export small pelagic fish to the EU without any restrictions. This has raised concerns about the sustainability of Ghana’s fish stocks and the exploitation of the endangered species.

Mr. Frank Aihoon is the managing director of Panofi Company and President of the Ghana Tuna Association. His company currently holds an export license to the EU. He acknowledged that his company exports small pelagic and Tuna but maintained that he adheres to the regulations.

“I know the small pelagic fish stock is an endangered species,” he said, adding, “There are people who are using the wrong fishing net, which is affecting the fish stock, especially the trawlers.”

Disturbingly, documents obtained during this investigation also showed that eight industrial trawlers were fined a combined 492,000 cedis in the first quarter of 2023 for various fishery infractions, a figure significantly lower than what is required by law. Meanwhile, information on whether these fines were paid remains undisclosed.

A review of the licensed vessel list for the second quarter of 2023 showed that vessel owners: Wannimas Complex, Obourwe & Co. Ltd and Nduman Fishing had been re-licensed to operate in Ghana’s waters, raising questions about the effectiveness of the ministry’s penalties and regulatory oversight.

Mr. Aihoon underscored the urgent need for enforcement of existing laws, warning that failure to do so would have far-reaching consequences for the entire fishing sector, not just the trawlers.

“The regulators need to enforce the laws because when the EU bans Ghana it will affect everyone in the fishing sector, not only the trawlers,” he argued.

For fisherman Francis Adam and his association members, the fishing trade that was once the backbone of thriving and a vibrant local economy is now a pale shadow of itself.

“We can’t survive for long with all these challenges, we simply can’t, something must be done, perhaps the EU, but the minister and her team must do more” he said.

The report is by Gideon Sarpong. Daniel Abugre Anyorigya contributed to the report.

This report is supported by JournalismFund Europe.

The post The endangered ‘People’s Fish’ flood the EU market deepening the plight of Ghanaian fishers appeared first on iWatch Africa.

In Ghana and Nigeria, ADRF’s support has seen iWatch Africa engage 20 newsrooms on online safety of women journalists. Leveraging the Keeping Journalists Safe Online: A Guide for Newsrooms in West Africa and Beyond, the newsrooms were supported to set up safety protocols and response measures to safeguard women journalists against abuse.

Through a multiplier model, journalists from the supported newsrooms (10 from Ghana and 10 from Nigeria) also underwent a Training of Trainers programme on the use of filtering applications such as TRFilter which helps document and manage online harassment and abuse. Furthemore, the participants discussed strategies through which journalists, government agencies and civil society could push back more effectively against online violence. The training facilitators included practitioners from Thomson Reuters Foundation; iWatch Africa; Techpreneur Magazine; The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ); and Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII).

The trained journalists have since gone on to train an additional 100 journalists within their networks. A further offshoot from the project was the formation of a discussion forum for networking, sharing experiences and lessons learned amongst the supported newsrooms.

The ADRF, an initiative of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) has previously supported iWatch Africa to track, document and analyse online abuse and harassment against journalists and rights activists covering political and societal issues in Ghana. In partnership with the Ghana Police and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), iWatch Africa developed draft guidelines for the prevention of online abuse and harassment. The organisation has continued to undertake advocacy in the field while engaging stakeholders on offering legal support for victims to seek redress.

According to Gideon Sarpong, the Executive Director of iWatch Africa, ADRF’s support has helped raise awareness about the importance of protecting journalists and contributed to a safer media environment. “The cohort of journalists trained and their newsrooms could be the catalysts to curbing digital violence against women journalists in Ghana and Nigeria,” said Sarpong.

According to the State of Media Freedom and Safety of Journalists in Africa Report for 2022, trolling and online harassment of journalists has become a serious threat to press freedom. It notes that trolls threaten and silence critical journalists and harass many, particularly women, forcing some to abandon social media. (Xanax) According to the report, the low levels of digital security skills; poor reporting of online abuses to law enforcement agencies; the limited skills and interest of authorities in investigating and prosecuting cyber crimes; and the inadequacy of existing laws in tackling trolling and online violence especially against women, only exacerbate the problem.

The ADRF was established in recognition that technology had become pivotal to promoting livelihoods and human rights on the continent but there was a need to strengthen local capacity in evidence-based research, skills and knowledge, collaborative advocacy and impactful policy engagements responsive to regulatory and practice developments that affect internet freedom in Africa.

The ADRF’s supporters have included the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the Ford Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the German Society for International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), New Venture Fund (NVF) and the Omidyar Network.

Ashnah Kalemera | CIPESA

The post Mitigating Online Abuse Against Women Journalists in Ghana and Nigeria appeared first on iWatch Africa.

Invasive weeds are a big problem when working on rubber farms. They compete for resources with young rubber plants and can act as hosts for pests and disease. Boafo was therefore supplied with chemicals that would help stave them off. 

One of these chemicals was paraquat — a highly toxic herbicide that can have severe, sometimes fatal, consequences if ingested and poses a negative impact on the environment.

“The biggest side effect of the job has to do with chemical use,” said Boafo, who used to work for GREL as a truck driver before becoming a rubber farmer. “If you apply the chemicals [paraquat] as instructed, then there will be no issues but if you don’t you will suffer severe medical complications.” 

Paraquat has been banned in the European Union since 2007. Yet the rubber outgrower plantation project, which was designed to assist small farmers in rural areas of Ghana and has already been taken up by thousands of people, was funded by a French public development bank called Agence Française de Dévelopment (AFD). 

Public development banks are state-owned and support private investments in projects with the goal of helping developing countries. This contradiction — that European public banks allegedly help countries abroad by financing projects that use pesticides and herbicides they themselves strictly prohibit — raises ethical questions about double standards, critics say.

“There is a certain hypocrisy in the EU: we ban pesticides to protect the health of European citizens and our environment but we support their use abroad by funding development projects or by exporting our chemical industries,” said Martin Dermine, director of Pesticide Action Network, a U.K-based charity focused on pesticide-related issues. 

The hypocrisy extends far beyond Ghanaian borders. The investigation found similar examples of European public banks funding millions into projects that involve the use of EU-banned pesticides abroad. These include the Dutch Bank, FMO, investing in eucalyptus plantations in Paraguay through a Luxembourg-based private equity fund, Arbaro Fund, and multiple loans of over 100 million Euros by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank, to modernize Uzbekistan’s cotton industry. 

In Ghana, AFD said they conduct environmental and social risk assessment prior to funding such projects. They added that the scheme has allowed for a “reduction in poverty in rural areas thanks to the regular income and training rubber plantation farmers get.” They did not deny the use of paraquat on GREL premises.

GREL instead denied the use of the herbicide. Lionel Barré, Managing director of the company, insisted that the company “has never delivered or recommended this pesticide to any farmer.” Gregory Mensah, land use manager at GREL between 2015 and 2020, also denied its use.

Yet, a pan-European investigation including iWatch Africa, Mediapart, Nederlands Dagblad, De Groene Amsterdammer, El Surtidor and led by Lighthouse Reports, a collaborative investigative newsroom, shows otherwise. Three farmers, 2 of which were direct beneficiaries of the rubber outgrowers project, said they were provided paraquat by GREL. A scientific study looking at the costs of using weed killers on AFD-funded smallholder rubber plantations, published in 2021, also explicitly mentions “paraquat-derivatives” as being one of the commonly used pesticides. The study is based on a survey of 80 smallholder farmers. 

“What goes on is that people in the global south are being exposed to highly hazardous substances,” said Marcos Orellana, UN special rapporteur for toxics and human rights. 

None of the 6 farmers iWatch Africa and Lighthouse Reports spoke to expressed being harmed through pesticide use, although some admitted having little knowledge of its potentially negative health effects and therefore opted not to wear protective equipment. 

***

The project, known as the Rubber Outgrower Plantation Project (ROPP), dates back to 1995, when the rubber company, GREL, struck a partnership with the government of Ghana, AFD and the German development bank, KfW to pay farmers small loans via two intermediary national banks — the Agricultural Development Bank and National Investment Bank. 

Agriculture represents about 20 percent of Ghana’s GDP and the rubber plantation initiative was intended to provide employment and steady income to farmers in rural areas as well as dampen the rising rural-urban migration faced by the country. 

The scheme involved 5 phases and provided loans to nearly 9,000 smallholder farmers in three regions of Ghana to help them with growing their own rubber plantations under the guidance of GREL. The final phase of the scheme, which lasted between 2014 and 2020 involved an investment of 17.7 million Euros, but total investments, through intermediary banks, tally up to nearly 60 million.

Farmers are given small loans by the Agricultural Development Bank, which they pay off by selling the product back to GREL at market price. Documents obtained by iWatch Africa and Lighthouse Reports, however, show that some farmers still struggle to pay back loans of up to 4,000 Euros, which fluctuate with the currency and often rise over time. They also often live far away from GREL and can get better deals selling their rubber elsewhere. Some of the farmers iWatch Africa spoke to therefore opt for selling their rubber to a competitor in the Wassa East region called Narubiz, although they are met with resistance from officials of GREL. 

“GREL supported us with the farm, but they are now threatening us not to sell our products to other companies,” said Sekyere Krobo, a young rubber farmer from the Western Region. “I am overwhelmed with the loan that my deceased mother incurred which keeps ballooning because of the pricing in Euros.”

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Beyond Ghana, the situation is also dire. The company European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) jointly funded, Indorama Agro, pledged to uphold strong environmental and regulatory standards and conducted extensive environmental impact assessments in the region, especially given its fraught history with forced and child labour.

Despite these efforts, Lighthouse Reports and iWatch Africa found evidence that several hazardous chemicals were being used, including indoxacarb, chlorates, and chlorpyrifos — all of which have been banned in the EU. Part of this information comes from Indorama Agro’s own list of pesticides from 2022, obtained by Lighthouse Reports via Bankwatch Network, a non-governmental organization that monitors funding by public financial institutions.

Further exclusive documents obtained include a letter addressed to Bankwatch Network, where EBRD states: “The Bank recognises the issue of the Company utilising pesticides banned or restricted for use in the EU,” adding that they had raised the issue with Indorama Agro who had “agreed to consider what EU approved alternatives are regulated for use within Uzbekistan.”

An anonymous monitoring survey of 20 former and current employees, as well as local residents, conducted by Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, a German-based non-governmental organization that works to protect human rights abuses in Uzbekistan, also reveals that Indorama Agro does not always provide protective equipment and instructions. It also confirms the use of hazardous chemicals used by cotton farmers.

Some describe being “short of breath”; others report witnessing relatives and acquaintances working for the company with symptoms including “blurred vision, abnormal hair and tooth loss, liver-gallbladder problems, white pigment disease on the skin, and gastrointestinal tract problem.”

Lighthouse Reports tried to get in contact with people from the monitoring survey on multiple occasions but they preferred not to speak out of fear of losing their jobs. Gulnoz Mamarasulova, director of the Representative Office of Association Central Asia in Uzbekistan, a non-governmental organization that works on democracy and human rights issues in the region, interviewed half of the people in the survey, confirmed the monitoring survey findings.

Indranil Majumdar, chief operating officer at Indorama Agro, declined to respond to questions, but said that the company has “a robust ‘Integrated pest management’ process which addresses all the points mentioned.”

EBRD and IFC did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

In Paraguay, FMO’s indirect financing of eucalyptus plantations via Arbaro Fund in Forestal San Pedro and Foresto Apepu has also been a source of controversy. 

In an auditing report, Arbaro Fund lists haloxyfop as one of its pesticides used since 2021 — a herbicide that is not approved in the EU since 2020. The report goes on to explain that the substance will be used on 210 hectares of land in San Pedro between 2021 and 2026. The project also entails the use of 5,000 kg of fipronil, a pesticide linked to cancer and the mass dying of bees and has therefore been restricted in the EU since 2013.

Arbaro Fund acknowledges its use but maintains that “fewer pesticides are used on the farm than in the past.” They add that haloxyfop will only be used exceptionally to treat weeds, and that the company will do everything in its power to protect workers who may have to handle it.

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The reasons for why European public development banks fund such questionable projects are complex. At least part of the answer comes down to EU regulations on pesticides being relaxed enough for these banks not to be held accountable. These banks also have “exclusion lists” which are documents which outline the kinds of projects they will not finance, but they are not legally binding. 

There are also no international laws that can outrightly ban the use of pesticides.“Unfortunately, there are no international laws that allow for global bans on pesticides,” said Dermine. “ Worse, when the European Union tries to ban new pesticides on its territory, many states try to dissuade it via WTO rules.”

Another problem lies with the lack of thorough and meaningful on-the-ground monitoring. GREL, for instance, actively supplied smallholder farmers with paraquat and protective equipment, according to farmers iWatch Africa spoke to, but the company had few resources dedicated to actually monitoring the use of Personal Protective Equipment supplied. Local farmers interviewed revealed that there was “only one GREL extension officer” dedicated to monitoring all smallholder farmers at Sekyere Aboaboso in the Wassa East district admitting that they “didn’t always use protective gear” due to limited supervision.

Mensah, the former assistant technical officer and later manager for land use for GREL, said paraquat were not used for industrial production of rubber, but said it’s possible they were used by farmers in the smallholder scheme because it is costly to keep track of their activities.

“When we started with these farmers we gave them planting materials,” said Mensah. “But if we get involved in the maintenance activities it’s going to put a lot of costs on us.”

Yet, the cost to thousands of farmers being exposed to hazardous herbicides may dwarf any monitoring investment by GREL.

Farmer Boafo, currently 60 years old, is sometimes preoccupied with thoughts about his health in the near future. He is aware that the negative consequences of being exposed to hazardous chemicals may not become apparent immediately. 

“In the future, I hope that these chemicals won’t pose any health problems to us,” he said.

Writing and reporting by Jonathan Moens and Gideon Sarpong. 

This report was supported by Journalismfund Europe.

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