Reporters who investigate politics, corruption, conflict and human rights are facing a growing wave of cyber-enabled attacks, ranging from coordinated online harassment and disinformation campaigns to hacked messaging accounts, compromised news websites and threats that spill into real-world danger.

What makes this new threat especially insidious is its reach. A single post can trigger thousands of hostile messages, a hacked WhatsApp account can collapse months of investigative work, an online smear can isolate a journalist socially, professionally and psychologically – all without a single physical confrontation.

For many journalists, the consequence is not just fear, but disrupted reporting, disrupted livelihoods and disrupted lives.“During this period, I lived like a fugitive,” says Ghanaian journalist, Ibrahim Abode, formerly with Channel One TV, as he describes the harrowing weeks between February and April 2025 when online threats forced him into hiding.

The messages were sent by individuals linked to factions involved in the decades-long Bawku chieftaincy conflict.

“After I reported on killings  in both Bawku and Walewale, I was constantly in hiding,” he recalled in a chat with The Fourth Estate. “Whenever I went out, I wore a nose mask to conceal my identity.”

The violence he reported was brutal and unrelenting. In one incident, a bus traveling from Kumasi to Garu was ambushed by gunmen moments after stopping in front of the ADB Bank in Walewale. The attack, allegedly linked to the Bawku chieftaincy conflict, came just days after a similar assault when three passengers were killed and their bus set ablaze near Wulugu on the Bolgatanga-Tamale highway.

“Their concerns were that I had reported on some of the killings of people, including women and children,” he recalls.

“The online threats and trolling flooded my phone, turning a digital intimidation into a fear that reshaped my daily life.”

Despite the threats, he believes his reports helped police to bring the culprits to book.

“When I reported, the security [officials] went there, arrested some people and then imposed curfew on the area,” Abode says.

But the threats did not stop with him. Some targeted his immediate family, pushing his mother into a state of fear that saw her begging him to abandon journalism altogether.

As pressure mounted, Abode lost his job at Channel 1 TV. He believes his dismissal was prompted by one of his responses to some of the people who were threatening him. His former employers reportedly insisted that his response was “rude”.

“I am completely traumatised psychologically and still struggling to find my feet,” Abode says with a hint of regret.

A silent takeover

While Abode faced threats linked to violent conflict, Thelma Dede-Amedeku, an investigative journalist and fact-checker with The Fourth Estate, encountered a different form of digital attack: the takeover of her WhatsApp account.

The first sign came in the form of strange messages. These were repeated prompts requesting verification codes she had never asked for. Because she had activated two-factor authentication, she ignored them. But on November 7, 2025, everything changed.

“I got a notification that I had been logged out. I couldn’t log back in,” she says.

Suddenly, she lost access to the platform that held conversations with sources.

“I almost cried. I had sensitive information there. And the person who took over could have accessed all of it. That was terrifying,” Dede-Amedeku stated.

Her organisation had already faced a separate incident where their website was compromised, and stories were wiped from the server. But this personal attack struck harder. The takeover happened at a time when her editor was also experiencing a similar block on WhatsApp, prompting suggestions that both incidents were connected to their work — particularly given their roles in fact-checking and accountability journalism.

She reported the issue, eventually receiving support from the Cybersecurity Authority and Meta to retrieve her account after several days of uncertainty.

Digital attacks increasing in frequency and severity 

Philip Kwasi Banini, Co-founder of iWatch Africa, explains that attacks on digital platforms as experienced by Miss Dede-Amedeku and Mr. Adobe are increasing in both frequency and severity across Ghana.

“Reports from the DisinfoEye initiative shows that insults dominate at 70%, followed by sexual harassment at 20%, and defamation/smear campaigns at 10%,” Mr. Banini told the Fourth Estate. “Approximately 60% of abuse targets female journalists, who face additional gendered attacks such as body-shaming and sexualised threats. 80% of cases occur on X (formerly Twitter), 20% on Facebook. Political commentary drives 50% of abuses, followed by cultural issues (30%) and corruption (20%).”

According to Mr. Banini social media platforms have become the primary battleground for these attacks, making them more public, rapid and harder to trace.

Data by iWatch Africa shows that 502 instances of online abuse were documented in just three months of 2025. In 2020, it recorded over 5,000 cases targeting journalists and rights activists.

The data gathered between July and September 2025 revealed that journalists Richard Dela Sky, Berla Mundi, Serwaa Amihere, and Manasseh Azure Awuni were among the most abused, highlighting a significant threat to press freedom and democratic dialogue.

“Women journalists are disproportionately targeted, attacks often follow stories on corruption, politics, or other contentious issues and coordinated online abuse – rather than random trolling – is increasingly common,” the report noted.

In Ghana, gaps within the legal and institutional frameworks further expose journalists, leaving many without meaningful avenues for redress, according to Mr. Banini.

Cybersecurity and legal experts say that the solution is not merely to pass new laws, but to properly test and enforce existing ones.

Desmond Israel, a lawyer and technology governance expert, told The Fourth Estate that Ghana already has several statutes capable of addressing many of these digital abuses, but they remain largely underutilised.

For example, Mr. Israel argued that Ghana must first examine whether current laws, such as the Criminal Offences Act, the Electronic Transactions Act, the Data Protection Act, and the Cybersecurity Act, already contain provisions that can be leveraged to protect journalists before rushing to pass new legislation.

“You can make laws, but if people are not putting those laws to the test, you’ll never feel their impact. The laws we have are broad. They were not written with today’s platform-driven abuse in mind. When journalists report digital threats, the question becomes: does this fit into an existing offence? That ambiguity leaves many unprotected,” he says.

“Our mechanisms for reporting are fragmented. A journalist may report to the police, but the police may not have the training for digital forensics. Cybersecurity bodies may have capacity, but not the mandate to prosecute. That disconnect leaves attackers emboldened.”

The authors, Juliet Etefe and Winifred Lartey, are 2025 Fellows of the Next Generation Investigative Journalism Fellowship – Cohort 7 at the Media Foundation for West Africa.

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Sarpong, a co-founder at iWatch Africa, and currently the Africa Regional Coordinator for the Environmental Justice Foundation has a decade of experience in environmental advocacy, and investigative journalism, and has established himself as a prominent figure in Africa’s media and policy landscape.

He is an alumnus of prestigious initiatives including the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), Thomson Reuters Foundation, Commonwealth Youth Program, Free Press Unlimited, and Bloomberg Data for Health Initiative.  Additionally, Sarpong founded the Ghana Hub of Sustainable Ocean Alliance and GKS Network.

His accolades include being a 2021 Policy Leader Fellow at the European University Institute’s School of Transnational Governance in Florence, Italy, a 2020 Open Internet for Democracy Leader, and a 2023 Pulitzer Ocean Reporting Network Fellow.

In 2022, he was a Fellow at the Reuters Institute at Oxford University and was also 2024 Resilience Fellow at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC).

The German Visitor’s Programme, organized by the Federal Foreign Office, invites foreign opinion leaders to experience Germany firsthand and engage in dialogues on pressing global issues. Themed trips like this one bring together participants from diverse countries to delve into topics such as climate politics, environmental peacebuilding, and Germany’s role in addressing the climate crisis.

Germany’s emphasis on the climate-peace-security nexus aligns with its broader foreign policy, including initiatives like the Climate for Peace and support for the United Nations’ Climate Security Mechanism. As climate change exacerbates conflicts, inequality, and displacement, the programme aims to foster international collaboration and innovative solutions.

Sarpong’s selection underscores the growing recognition of African voices in global discussions on climate and security.

This opportunity comes at a pivotal time, as global leaders intensify efforts to integrate climate action with peacebuilding. Germany’s National Security Strategy and Climate Foreign Policy Strategy emphasize addressing these interlinkages, and the Visitor’s Programme serves as a platform for sharing best practices and building networks.

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Abuse of journalists in Ghana’s digital space is rising, a trend experts warn could exert a profound “chilling effect” on journalism, undermining a key pillar of a democratic society: press freedom. The survey shows that journalists covering contentious social, political, and cultural issues are increasingly targeted by those opposing their views, often using social media platforms like X and Facebook to launch barrages of insults, sexual harassment, and defamation.

Key findings from 502 cases tracked

The DisinfoEye platform’s third quarter snapshot, analyzed and examined specific instances of abuse across eight journalists, contributing to a total of 502 cases since monitoring began. In all, data from 20 journalists were examined.

Key insights include:

• Abuse types: Insults dominate at 70% (352 cases), followed by sexual harassment at 20% (100 cases), and defamation/smear campaigns at 10% (50 cases).
• Gender disparity: Approximately 60% of abuses target female journalists, who face additional gendered attacks such as body-shaming and sexualized threats.
• Platforms: 80% of cases occur on X/Twitter, 20% on Facebook.
• High-risk topics: Political commentary drives 50% of abuses, followed by cultural issues (30%) and corruption (20%).

A 2020 UNESCO report showed that 31% of journalists tone down coverage due to online harassment, while 15% abandon stories entirely.

Top eight most abused journalists

The DisinfoEye platform identified the following journalists as the most abused, based on harassment instances tracked:

Gendered abuse and press freedom

DisinfoEye’s data reaffirms the UNESCO finding that female journalists bear an extra burden, with 60% of abuses and also face sexualized insults. These attacks suppress diverse media voices. The platform’s hotline received over 50 reports, enabling interventions like counseling and legal support. Smear campaigns, up 25% during election seasons, threaten further growth, with a projected 20% rise by 2026 without action.

Gideon Sarpong, iWatch Africa’s co-founder and digital rights expert, stated:

“iWatch Africa is determined to work closely with CHRAJ, policymakers, and law enforcement to develop protocols for psychological and legal support for journalists, proper reporting of online harassment, and enhanced content moderation. All criminal-level abuses will be submitted to the police and CHRAJ for investigation and redress.”

“The rapid proliferation of AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic media is dramatically intensifying targeted attacks and abuses against journalists. To counter this escalating threat, the journalism community, tech platforms, and policymakers must adopt far more robust, coordinated, and proactive measures including real-time detection tools, sustained digital-safety training, and enforceable accountability mechanisms for those who weaponise these technologies.”

The DisinfoEye initiative has so far empowered 20 newsrooms in Ghana with Online Safety Units, and trained 5 monitors for real-time tracking, and reached over 5 million Ghanaians through awareness campaigns.

Journalists can directly report abuses via www.disinfoeye.com or contact info@iwatchafrica.org.

The 502 cases documented by DisinfoEye, expose a critical threat to Ghanaian journalists. Through real-time data, advocacy, and partnerships, iWatch Africa is committed to building a safer digital ecosystem to safeguard press freedom and bolster Ghana’s democracy.

Report by iWatch Africa

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Presentations that Set the Agenda

Philip Kwasi Banini opened the substantive part of the meeting with a detailed overview of the project’s aims, including empowering journalists, exposing disinformation campaigns and fostering media literacy. He outlined how DisinfoEye is working to generate credible data, collaborate with tech firms and scale its impact across Ghanaian newsrooms.

Moro Seidu followed with a presentation titled “Understanding Online Harassment & Abuse Against Journalists”. He explained the various forms of digital threats – from doxxing and troll campaigns to sexualised attacks – and reviewed trends specific to Ghana, drawn from recent platform data. Seidu emphasised the gendered dimensions of online abuse and the importance of structured monitoring.

Review of Progress & Impact

The project, supported by Impact Amplifier, set four major outcomes: reducing online abuse of women journalists and children; enhancing internet literacy among journalists; establishing tracking and mitigation systems in 20 newsrooms; and educating over 5 million Ghanaians on protecting journalists. Presenters reported that the training of 20 journalists and 5 monitors is complete, all 20 newsrooms have Online Safety Units underway, and campaign outreach is nearing its 5 million-person target.

Monitors confirmed use of the DisinfoEye platform to document incidents in real-time. They highlighted improved detection and flagging of harassment cases, especially those directed at female journalists.

Challenges & Lessons Learned

Discussion flagged key obstacles: restricted access to social-media APIs due to budget limits, uneven newsroom staffing and capacity, and the difficulty of monitoring abuse across local languages and platforms. Seidu’s presentation emphasised that while data-driven monitoring is essential, without platform cooperation and newsroom resources the impact remains limited. The group agreed on the need for shared resource-pools and flexible tools.

Looking Ahead: Sustainability & Scale

The meeting concluded with a call for the next phase: expanding DisinfoEye to 50 newsrooms by 2026, securing funding for advanced analytics and API access, deepening partnerships with tech firms, and launching refresher training for monitors and newsroom staff. iWatch Africa reiterated its commitment to working with regulatory bodies and media houses to institutionalise online-safety protocols.

Why This Matters

As journalism shifts deeper into digital spaces, the training, monitoring and data-generation spearheaded by DisinfoEye become critical to press freedom, especially in Ghana. The insights shared by Banini and Seidu highlight that without structural support and a monitoring ecosystem, online harassment can silence voices, shrink coverage and weaken democratic accountability.

Source: iWatch Africa

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Mr. Banini, who is a co-founder of iWatch Africa will undertake this fellowship at the Norwegian Centre for Law of the Sea in Tromsø, Norway, for a period of two months during, November, and December 2025. His selection follows a highly competitive application process that attracted researchers from across the country.

As a researcher with a demonstrated interest in ocean governance, Mr. Banini presented a compelling research proposal that aligned perfectly with the fellowship’s objective to foster international collaboration and enhance academic exchange between Ghana and Norway. During his time at NCLOS, he will conduct independent research on “Comprehensive Legal Framework for Marine Protected Areas in Ghana” that is central to ocean governance and the law of the sea. He will also engage with NCLOS faculty, participate in academic discussions, seminars, conferences and workshops, and collaborate with other researchers on ongoing projects.

A key expectation of the fellowship is the production of a publishable research paper or report to be disseminated by both NCLOS and the University of Ghana. Mr. Banini will also present his findings and progress at designated intervals to both institutions. Upon his return, he will be formally affiliated with the University of Ghana’s Ocean Governance Project as a researcher, further strengthening the project’s capacity.

The selection committee, comprising representatives from the University of Ghana Ocean Governance Project and the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea, reviewed applications based on academic excellence, proven research capabilities, and the quality of the proposed research.

The entire University of Ghana School of Law community congratulates Mr. Philip Kwasi Banini on this outstanding achievement and wishes him success as he represents the University on this international platform. We look forward to the valuable contributions he will make to the field of Ocean Governance and Law of the Sea.

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Inside a 40-foot shipping container from the United States, falsely declared as personal effects, were nine pistols, eight assault rifles, and 219 rounds of live ammunition. The discovery first announced by the Ghana Revenue Authority, was not just a smuggling bust but a window into a deeper, more systematic problem: the persistent attempts by criminal networks to arm violent groups in Ghana.

Four years on, the investigation shows that the weapons shipment which were concealed beneath rice and household goods in blue barrels, originated from the Port of Baltimore, Maryland, and was linked to Kojo Owusu Dartey, a U.S. Army Major stationed in North Carolina.

According to court indictment documents reviewed as part of this investigation, Kojo Owusu Dartey, orchestrated this scheme with the aid of Staff Sergeant George Archer and others. The indictment noted that these individuals knowingly violated Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(a)(1)(A) and 924 by engaging in unlicensed firearms dealing and illegally exporting weapons without a license.

U.S. federal authorities later prosecuted Dartey, securing a jury conviction in April 2024 on charges of smuggling firearms without an export license, making false statements to federal agencies, and dealing in firearms without a license. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison in February 2025.

The Ghana Police Service did not respond to a right to information request on possible conspirators in Ghana as part of the September 2021 weapons seizure.

The Attorney General’s office and the Ministry of Interior in Ghana did not respond to a right of reply request and a further request to provide status update on sixteen other cases involving major firearms seizures, diversions and arrests in the last five years in Ghana.

Infographic below:

“These weapons were likely destined for groups like violent groups in Bawku, or criminal networks,” says top national security source who spoke to us on condition of anonymity.

That pattern of opacity, and silence by the state has only fuelled a climate of impunity, enabling the very smuggling networks and violent actors the state purports to be combating.

“The big people (government officials) themselves are involved in the criminal networks that facilitate arms networks,” said security analyst Professor Kwesi Aning.

Ghana is noted as a supplier of weapons in West Africa to criminal networks. Despite no evidence that the weapons seized at the Tema port was intended for violent extremist groups, several reports have shown how Ghana’s underground artisanal firearm sector end up supporting conflicts internally and within West Africa.

According to a 2020 Small Arms Survey’s report “, Ghanaian gunsmiths are able to produce semi-automatic or automatic weapons, including copies that closely resemble factory-made counterparts such as locally made copies of AK-pattern assault rifles referred to as ‘washman’ capable of single-shot or automatic fire (with a standard 30-round magazine), as well as copies of Russian, Chinese, North Korean, Libyan, and Serbian versions of the world-renowned Soviet AK-47 automatic assault rifles.

Another report by Small Arms Survey titled: Trafficking and smuggling in the Burkina Faso– Côte d’ivoire–Mali region  also noted Ghana is a source of black-market explosives and arms trafficked into the tri-border region via routes like Bondoukou–Bouna–Varale–Doropo and through Burkina Faso’s Pô and Zabré entry points. These “ants trade” smuggling operations using motorcycles and concealed cargo supply extremist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso.

In April, 2025, the Ghana police announced it had intercepted 33,000 ammuni­tion packed in 132 boxes concealed in an Accra–Be­nin bound Hyundai bus during a routine inspection.

This is “very concerning” said the national security official. “The state must thoroughly investigate to identify the powerful people behind this.”

Ghana finds itself at a crossroads: either plug the gaping movement of arms within its own borders or risk becoming the next front in a widening regional war.

In July 2025, Ghana’s late Defence Minister, Omane Boamah, made troubling disclosures about lapses in ammunition control. “I have disclosed that in 2024, there was an incident of ammunition moving from the Ghana Armed Forces to the National Security in 2024. As we speak, the National Security Secretariat under President Mahama is investigating the movement of ammunition,” he stated.

He added: “Beyond that particular case is another one that we have uncovered, that prior to the 2024 incident, there was also theft of ammunition within the Ghana Armed Forces.

“I am raising this because such ammunitions find their way into the hands of people who are not well trained and have ulterior motives.”

“In a region where armed groups feed off weak institutions and smuggled weapons, the inability to fully prosecute arms trafficking cases is a national security failure of the highest order,” said the national security official.

“Weapons (two cases above) like these don’t just disappear. Someone is arming someone. And we may not want to admit it, but that ‘someone’ could be right across our borders or already within them,” he added.

Failure of the state to aggressively prosecute some previous weapons smuggling cases and related arrests is stark warning of how Ghana, long a beacon of stability in West Africa, can be drawn into the deadly orbit of violent extremist groups.

Jihadist groups and a family’s escape from terror

According to a 2024 report by the Dutch think tank the Clingendael Institute, Ghana’s northern frontier stretching about 500 kilometers along Burkina Faso’s volatile south has become a conduit for supplies, recruits, and safe havens that sustain jihadist insurgencies.

The report further notes that the absence of direct attacks on Ghanaian soil appears to be a calculated decision: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is avoiding disruptions to these critical supply chains and refraining from provoking Ghana’s relatively capable security forces — at least for now.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is a militant Islamist group operating across the Sahel, linked to al-Qaeda and active in insurgencies in Mali, Burkina Faso, and neighboring countries.

Meanwhile, at the Zini Refugee Camp near Ghana’s northwestern border with Burkina Faso, the effects of this growing crisis are on full display.

In the refugee camp, a dusty outpost in Ghana’s upper west region, Hajiratu, a 32-year-old mother of four, sits under a tarp, her eyes heavy with grief. Years ago, in Fada N’Gourma, Burkina Faso, JNIM militants stormed her home at dusk.

“They fired guns, took my husband, blindfolded him with his shirt, and dragged him away,” she recalls, her voice trembling. “Those who resisted were killed on the spot.”

Now among 867 refugees in Zini, a camp established in April 2024, Hajiratu grapples with an uncertain future. Just recently, 46 new arrivals from Kayaa and Pissila in Burkina Faso joined her, fleeing similar ultimatums: “convert to Islam or die,” they said.

Asata, another refugee, shares a parallel agony. Her brother was abducted by Fulbe militants, his fate unknown. “I see his terror-filled eyes every night,” she says.

“Is he alive, forced to fight, or dead?”

Such personal horrors underscore the impact of Sahel’s jihadist violence into Ghana, where porous borders allow not just militants but also the displaced to cross freely.

These accounts, gathered when journalist, Gideon Sarpong visited the camp, reflect the Sahel’s spiralling violence, with over 110,000 displaced to Northern Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire since October 2024, according to UNHCR.

The camp offers fragile safety, but food shortages and education gaps exacerbated by a shift from food aid to cash stipends leave refugees like Hajiratu and Asata dependent on dwindling support, dreaming of farmlands to rebuild their lives.

Bawku: A Tinderbox at the Border, border challenges & violent extremist groups

Just 30 kilometers from Burkina Faso, the town of Bawku simmers on the edge of collapse. A long-standing ethnic conflict between the Mamprusi and Kusasi communities has escalated into a full-blown armed standoff, transforming this north eastern outpost into one of Ghana’s most volatile frontiers.

CONTEXT: The Mamprusi, descendants of a centralized kingdom tracing roots to the 17th century and known for their warrior traditions, claim historical chieftaincy over Bawku based on providing military aid to local groups against invaders. The Kusasi, who assert indigenous status as the area’s original inhabitants, maintain a traditionally acephalous society led by earth priests (tendaanas) rather than chiefs, and view the Mamprusi as newcomers imposed by colonial British policies favoring centralized structures for indirect rule. At its core, the dispute dating back to the early 20th century and exacerbated by post-independence political meddling revolves around land ownership, chieftaincy rights, and ethnic dominance. This has fueled cycles of violence that have killed hundreds and displaced thousands.

The deeper reality, however, is that insecurity in these areas has reached such heights that even access has become perilous. Journalists working on this investigation were unable to travel to key border communities in Ghana’s Upper East Region due to a recent spike in attacks on commercial vehicles along the Bolgatanga–Bawku–Pulmakom corridor.

The situation has grown so dire that Ghana’s own Inspector General of Police came under fire during a recent visit, with one officer injured in the ambush. In June 2025, President John Mahama publicly called on the military to guarantee safe passage for all passengers regardless of ethnic affiliation and goods along the route, which is a stark admission of how compromised state security has become in parts of the country.

“Now the police are almost not in the major conflict zones in the northern region; it is only the armed forces that are left. That is how serious a trouble we are in,” said Professor Kwesi Aning.

Meanwhile, at the Hamile border post in the Upper West Region, immigration officers, speaking on condition of anonymity, described an unsettling reality: dozens of unmonitored crossing points emerge during the dry season, when, as one officer put it, “every route becomes a potential crossing.” Surveillance systems are broken or non-existent, and officials lack the basic tools to control movement. “Some people just pass through. We can’t track them, we don’t even see them,” one said.

This vulnerability exploded into violence on September 13, 2025, when irate youth, fueled by accusations that an immigration officer aided armed gunmen from Burkina Faso to cross into Ghana and wrongfully attempted to deport a refugee woman, rampaged through the post setting a vehicle ablaze, burning tires, vandalizing the office, and even leading to the tragic collapse and death of a bystander amid the chaos.

Such eruptions not only shatter fragile community trust but underscore the dire urgency of bolstering border security.

“Ghana has not invested in its borders since 1951 and if you go to any border towns, we have no equipment. Even if we claim there is a security problem, our behaviour and investment do not reflect any insecurity,” Aning added. “It is the quality of training that we give to the border officials, the equipment that are available and a general security strategy that says we see borders as more of zones of engagement and deepening relations and as zones of crime and threat.”

Ghana’s immediate past ambassador to Burkina Faso, Boniface Gambila Adagbila, offered a rare public acknowledgment of the threat. “Believe it or not, they [extremists] are able to come into Ghana and go back,” he said in a recent interview. “They move in and go back… They roam, they come to our hospitals and go back.”

This quiet infiltration appears to extend well beyond the borderlands, reaching deep into the country’s urban centers.

“Yes, porous borders can potentially be a problem. Ghana has been a facilitator of violence and criminal networks in West Africa over the last 30 years,” said Professor Aning.

“Terrorists don’t need to come here we go to them because of the criminal networks that are here and because of the level of collusion between state officials and these criminal gangs otherwise ask yourself why should galamsey (illegal small scale mining) be allowed to thrive.”

A 2023 report by Small Arms Survey noted Ghana as a key source of diverted commercial explosives feeding jihadist networks in the Sahel, where “baguette”-style dynamite from its mining sector has been traced to artisanal sites in Burkina Faso and Mali controlled by JNIM.

“Ghana remains the preferred location for the sale of stolen or confiscated firearms,” Gideon Ofosu-Peasah, an analyst with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) wrote in a recent article. “JNIM is rumoured to have numerous meeting points and hideouts on the Ghanaian side of the borders with Togo and Burkina Faso.”

The porousness is not incidental, it is structural. A 2023 report by Promediation warns that Ghana’s proximity to Burkina Faso’s Cascades region and northern Côte d’Ivoire has made its northern corridor an attractive fallback zone for armed groups. The report estimates that between 200 and 300 Ghanaian youths have already been recruited into extremist groups linked to JNIM operating in and around the northern borders.

In June 2021, Abu Dujana, a Ghanaian Fulani, carried out a JNIM suicide bombing in Mali, urging attacks in Ghana in a chilling video. Targeting his kinsmen in Karaga, Northern Region, he exploited ethnic tensions and economic desperation.

Democracy and governance analyst R. Maxwell Bone cautions, that unless the militarized approach is replaced with one that prioritizes addressing the social exclusion rendering communities vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment, the security situation will continue to deteriorate.

Way forward

Since 2000, the Bawku conflict has claimed hundreds of lives, displaced at least 2,500 residents, and destroyed over 200 homes, according to a 2024 report published by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Over 80 people have been killed since 2024 as a result of the conflict.

But the deeper concern lies in how Bawku’s chaos may be drawing the attention and presence of jihadist actors operating in Burkina Faso’s Cascades region. Ghana’s former President, Nana Akufo-Addo, did not mince words in his 2024 State of the Nation Address, calling Bawku a “wasteland of destruction and distrust,” adding, “what should concern all of us and not just the people of Bawku is that, in its current state, Bawku is an alluring magnet to mischief makers and extremists operating a few kilometers across from the border.”

Recent incidents point to the creeping militarization of the Bawku area and expansion into other areas in Ghana. Two male students of Nalerigu Senior High School were shot and killed following a violent attack by unidentified gunmen in July, 2025 believed to be linked to the Bawku conflict.

On the ground, the fear is palpable. “What’s worrying is that you have youth openly brandishing rifles young boys moving with weapons they shouldn’t have,” said Mohammed, a prominent youth leader in Bawku. (His name has been changed to protect his identity.) “Just a few days ago, they stopped a water truck from entering town near the police station. That’s how bold it’s become.”

Mohammed described a town under siege, not just by its own tensions but by a deepening sense of abandonment. “It’s very difficult to get food into Bawku. I need military escort just to travel to Bolgatanga. We are all suffering. We just keep appealing to ourselves to stop, but nothing changes.”

What fuels the conflict, he said, isn’t just old grudges it’s money, ideology, and a steady flow of arms. “The whole conflict has been radicalized. People use all their resources to support it. I know residents from outside Bawku who buy weapons and send them hidden in Land Cruisers. The guns come from cities in the south. And the quantity here is scary. People fire all night and never run out.”

Despite no conclusive record of jihadist groups’ participation in the Bawku conflict, Mohammed’s fears go beyond local dynamics. “With the jihadist situation, I wouldn’t be surprised if some people from Bawku are involved. There’s a perception that both sides have links to jihadists. I doubt it’s widespread, but you can’t rule it out.”

His warning is echoed by Sadik, a fellow youth leader, who insists not just the widespread arming of civilians, but also the role of external funding in sustaining the violence. (His name has been changed to protect his identity.)

The conditions are eerily familiar to Dr. Kaderi Noagah Bukari, a senior research fellow and Head of Department of Peace Studies at the University of Cape Coast who has mapped the evolution of armed civilian groups along Ghana’s northern borders.

“Kwelugu, for instance, is home to several armed groups formed mainly by Kusasi communities,” he said. “Originally set up to combat cattle rustling, they now resemble vigilantes very much like the armed self-defense groups operating in Burkina Faso.”

Bukari warned of a widening security vacuum. “There are ungoverned spaces in northern Ghana,” he said. “The absence of sustained state presence has allowed these groups to entrench themselves.”

While Bukari was cautious about drawing direct links between Bawku’s factions and jihadist groups like JNIM or ISIS-Sahel, he was unequivocal about the danger.

“The region is heavily weaponised. Most of the arms come from within Ghana, from major cities in the south. And when you combine that level of armament with longstanding grievances and a culture of impunity, it becomes a powder keg. Vulnerabilities like this are exactly what extremists look for.”

For Professor Aning, the most threatening contribution to insecurity in Ghana is the “human factor.”

“The inability or incapacity of those mandated by law and the constitution to provide the protection,” he explained. “The sum total of the security challenges facing the country calls into question the effectiveness and the competence of public officials who are dealing with the compounding security challenges. We need a different approach.”

Report by Gideon Sarpong.

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“We built DisinfoEye because we saw the growing threats journalists—especially women—face online,” said Gideon Sarpong, Co-Founder of iWatch Africa. “This is not just a data platform; it’s a movement to protect truth and ensure that misinformation does not undermine democracy in Ghana.”

The growing threat of misinformation

The digital age has transformed how information is shared and consumed, but it has also given rise to a global crisis of misinformation. False narratives, viral hoaxes, and targeted harassment campaigns have eroded trust in media, undermined democratic processes, and endangered vulnerable groups, including journalists. In Ghana, where the media plays a critical role in fostering transparency and accountability, journalists face increasing threats of online abuse and disinformation. According to a 2024 report by the Media Foundation for West Africa, over 60% of Ghanaian journalists have experienced some form of online harassment, with many targeted by coordinated disinformation campaigns.

iWatch Africa, a leading organization dedicated to promoting digital safety and accountability, recognized the urgent need for a solution that could address this growing threat. DisinfoEye is the result—a robust platform that empowers journalists, fact-checkers, and citizens to combat misinformation effectively and in real-time.

DisinfoEye: a comprehensive approach to fighting disinformation

DisinfoEye stands out as a multifaceted platform that integrates cutting-edge AI technology with community engagement to address misinformation at its core. The platform is designed to operate 24/7, scanning and analyzing content across six or more digital platforms, including social media, news websites, and blogs. With a remarkable 92% detection accuracy, DisinfoEye processes over 200 pieces of content daily, identifying potential misinformation and flagging it for further review.

Key Features of DisinfoEye

AI-Powered Detection
At the heart of DisinfoEye lies its advanced AI algorithms, which are trained to identify patterns of misinformation in real-time. By analyzing text, images, and metadata, the platform can detect false narratives, manipulated content, and coordinated disinformation campaigns with unparalleled precision. This capability ensures that users stay ahead of emerging threats, enabling rapid responses to viral falsehoods.

Community Reporting Tools:
DisinfoEye empowers users to contribute to the fight against misinformation by submitting detailed reports on suspicious content. These reports feed into a growing database, which enhances the platform’s ability to track and analyze misinformation trends. By fostering community participation, DisinfoEye creates a collaborative ecosystem where citizens and professionals work together to uphold truth.

Social Media Monitoring:
The platform’s social monitoring tools track viral content and analyze social media patterns to identify the spread of misinformation. By mapping how false information propagates across platforms, DisinfoEye provides actionable insights for journalists, fact-checkers, and policymakers to counter disinformation campaigns before they gain traction.

Digital Safety and Empowerment:
Beyond detection, DisinfoEye prioritizes the safety and empowerment of its users. The platform offers resources and training programs to equip journalists and citizens with the skills needed to navigate online threats. From digital safety workshops to fact-checking guides, DisinfoEye ensures that its users are well-prepared to confront misinformation and harassment.

“Technology alone isn’t enough—we need communities to take part,” added Sarpong. “DisinfoEye blends advanced AI with human engagement to create a safer, more informed digital space.”

Impact in Ghana: training and awareness

As part of its launch, DisinfoEye has already made significant strides in Ghana. iWatch Africa has trained 20 journalists in digital safety and fact-checking, equipping them with the tools and knowledge to combat online abuse and misinformation. These journalists, drawn from various media houses across the country, are now part of a growing network of professionals dedicated to upholding truth in Ghana’s media landscape.

In addition to training, iWatch Africa has launched a nationwide digital campaign to raise awareness about misinformation and promote digital literacy. With a goal of reaching over 5 million Ghanaians, the campaign leverages DisinfoEye’s real-time tools to educate the public on identifying and countering false information. By focusing 95% of its efforts on combating disinformation, DisinfoEye is driving a cultural shift toward greater accountability and transparency in the digital space.

A call to action: join the fight for truth

The launch of DisinfoEye marks a pivotal moment in the global fight against misinformation. iWatch Africa invites individuals, organizations, media professionals, and civil society groups to join the DisinfoEye movement and contribute to a more informed digital world. By signing up at www.disinfoeye.com, users can access the platform’s real-time tools, submit reports, and learn more about its cutting-edge technology.

The platform’s user-friendly interface makes it accessible to a wide audience, from tech-savvy fact-checkers to everyday citizens concerned about the spread of false information. Whether you’re a journalist tracking a disinformation campaign, a citizen reporting a suspicious post, or an organization seeking to promote digital literacy, DisinfoEye offers the tools and resources to make a difference.

The technology behind DisinfoEye

DisinfoEye’s approach sets it apart as a leader in misinformation detection. The platform’s algorithms are designed to adapt to the evolving tactics of disinformation campaigns, ensuring that it remains effective against new and emerging threats. By analyzing linguistic patterns, visual manipulations, and network behaviors, DisinfoEye can identify subtle signs of misinformation that might go unnoticed by human moderators.

To ensure transparency and accountability, DisinfoEye provides users with detailed reports on flagged content, including the reasoning behind its detection. This feature not only builds trust in the platform but also educates users about the characteristics of misinformation, empowering them to make informed decisions about the content they encounter online.

Looking ahead: a vision for a truthful digital future

The launch of DisinfoEye is just the beginning. iWatch Africa envisions a future where the platform serves as a cornerstone of digital safety and accountability across Africa and beyond. By expanding its reach, enhancing its AI capabilities, and forging partnerships with media organizations, governments, and tech companies, DisinfoEye aims to set a global standard for combating misinformation.

In the coming months, iWatch Africa plans to roll out additional features for DisinfoEye, including enhanced analytics for tracking disinformation campaigns and expanded training programs for journalists and community leaders. The organization is also exploring collaborations with international fact-checking networks to amplify the platform’s impact.

Get involved today

iWatch Africa invites all stakeholders to join the DisinfoEye movement and take a stand against misinformation. Visit www.disinfoeye.com to sign up, explore the platform’s features, and contribute to the fight for truth.

“With support from partners like Impact Amplifier, we’re building a model that can be scaled across Africa to protect democratic discourse and defend truth,” Sarpong concluded.

For inquiries, contact iWatch Africa at:
📩 Email: info@iwatchafrica.org
📞 Phone: +233 240 791 865 | +233 560 520 654
📍 Address: No. 11 Dr. Morton Loop, Adabraka, Accra

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The training is part of a broader initiative to safeguard press freedom, protect media workers from digital threats, and generate credible data to push for stronger accountability and policy interventions. Over the next three months, the trained monitors will observe the social media activities of ten selected journalists across Facebook, X, Instagram, and TikTok. Using DisinfoEye, a purpose-built monitoring platform developed by iWatch Africa, they will document incidents of online abuse in real time. 

Philip Kwasi Banini, co-founder, welcomed participants by outlining the key aims of the project: to empower individuals with the skills to identify and resist misleading content; expose disinformation campaigns through data-driven investigations; foster media literacy among vulnerable populations, particularly students and marginalized communities; and collaborate with policymakers and technology companies to promote ethical information ecosystems.

“This initiative is not just about tracking abuse—it’s about protecting the voices that keep our democracy alive. When journalists are silenced by fear, the public loses access to truth,” he stated.

Moro Seidu then delivered a detailed Project Overview and Understanding Online Harassment & Abuse Against Journalists presentation. He explained the different forms of online harassment—such as doxxing, threats of violence, troll campaigns, sexualized abuse, and disinformation attacks—emphasizing that women journalists face unique, gendered, and often sexualized threats. Drawing from UNESCO’s 2021 report, he noted that 73% of women journalists globally have experienced online abuse, with many altering their reporting or abandoning stories entirely due to harassment. Moro also shared trends from iWatch Africa’s data, highlighting the rise of cyberbullying, coordinated troll campaigns, and politically motivated disinformation attacks in Ghana, particularly targeting female reporters after political or investigative stories.

“Online abuse is a global problem, but in Ghana, it threatens press freedom in very real ways. By equipping monitors with the skills to document these attacks, we are building a strong evidence base to push for accountability,” Moro said.

The session moved into a hands-on segment led by Shafui, an IT and Resources Personnel who demonstrated the DisinfoEye platform and guided participants on how to accurately log abuse cases, apply filters and tags, and maintain consistency in reporting. A simulation exercise followed, allowing participants to practice identifying abusive content and entering cases into the platform as if in a live monitoring scenario. 

The training concluded with a discussion on reporting requirements, documentation standards, and the project timeline.

This initiative is part of iWatch Africa’s commitment to advancing digital safety, media freedom, and the protection of human rights. The Online Safety Monitoring Program is supported by Impact Amplifier. Members of the public can follow the tracking of online abuse in real time by visiting: www.disinfoeye.com.

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While the EU has proudly pledged to help wean South Africa off its dependency on coal for both local energy and export wealth, European countries have quietly increased their own imports from the country dramatically. But while exports have been soaring, the EU admits that it doesn’t monitor whether the imported coal is ethically sourced. 

Critics warn that Europe isn’t doing enough to ensure its energy needs aren’t leaving a trail of destruction. Jule Fink, from the German-based anti-coal and anti-nuclear alliance Ende Gelände, says Europe is propping up South Africa’s coal trade without proper checks on where the coal comes from.

‘What we know,’ Fink explains, ‘is that a lot of coal is shipped to Rotterdam, for example, where it changes ships or containers. Afterwards, it’s very hard to tell imports apart, and under which conditions they were mined. This is a huge problem because it means it’s very difficult to know what human rights violations and what violence is in the coal. Therefore, we have to assume that everything is “blood coal”. It is also a main tool by coal importers to not take responsibility for the destruction and violence they cause.’

Fink, whose organisation raised awareness of coal imports from mines where human rights violations have taken place, explained that tracking coal imports connected to abuses entering Europe is made very difficult because of the complexity of supply chains. She also points out that importing coal while funding decarbonization initiatives completely undermines the work to decarbonise South Africa. ‘You can’t pretend to be funding energy transitions on the one hand, while, at the same time, funding the coal sector. That is just completely contradictory’, she adds.

An EU official told iWatch Africa that ‘while there is a general direction from the European Commission to phase out coal whilst diversifying where to source it, it is individual companies and member states that decide for themselves in line with their respective needs,’ adding, ‘there are no specific provisions on coal or on ethical coal as such’.

The EU official followed on saying that the EU has adopted the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, under which large companies ‘have an obligation to conduct due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate and bring to an end human rights and environmental violations.’ However, the policy will only become law in 2027.

Taken together, these mixed signals suggest the EU has yet to fully align its climate ambitions with its trade practices—advocating for sustainability while continuing to import coal under unclear ethical standards.

The contradiction is especially evident in the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), launched in 2021 to help shift South Africa toward a greener, more sustainable energy path. Backed by the International Partners Group (IPG)—which includes France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and the EU—the South African JETP is supposed to serve as a pilot model for how developed nations can support developing countries in decarbonising through public and private investment. So far, international pledges to South Africa’s JETP total US$12.8 billion.

However, just months after the EU’s commitment to the JETP and supporting South Africa in a just phase-out of coal, Europe’s coal imports from South Africa increased eightfold, reaching 3.54 million tons by 2024 – a 77% increase over 2021, according to Reuters. Much of this renewed interest came after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and the EU imposed sanctions on Russian coal and gas, causing European countries to turn to other coal suppliers, including South Africa. 

In 2023, the Port of Rotterdam reported processing 23.1 million tonnes of coal, including 1.7 million tonnes from South Africa. Global vessel tracking data reveals a steady flow of dry bulk ships from South Africa’s largest coal port, Richards Bay in KwaZulu-Natal, to the Netherlands. In 2024, two years after the EU and IPG countries boldly announced the JETP partnership, Europe accounted for 9% of South African coal exports.

Paradoxically, key European importers of South Africa’s coal include some of JETP’s biggest donors, including the EU, Germany, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands, according to The Coal Trader, a platform that informs investors on the mining and coal sectors. The trade not only undermines the bloc’s JETP efforts but also connects its coal supply chains to a host of social and environmental issues.

In South Africa, it’s clear to see that the situation is becoming increasingly pressing. Leaving Johannesburg, South Africa’s economic hub, you start to see the dark side effects of an economy dependent on coal. The highway stretches east into Mpumalanga, through informal settlements and toward coal country, where power stations spew smoke into skies tinged platinum gold. Roads are crowded with side-tipper trucks, their loads spilling coal onto the verges. The region suffers from pollution, health crises, and poverty. Dust hangs in the air, wildlife suffers, and communities face depression and high suicide rates.

iWatch spoke to people who said they have seen the supply chains being contaminated with illegal coal en route to places like Richards Bay. Sitting on a bench in the Khuthala community garden, Zethu Hlatshwayo, a former artisanal miner, locally called the zama zamas (those who take a chance), now spends his days planting vegetables to sell in the community. 

Rubbing his hands together, he reflects on the dark side of mining in Mpumalanga—coal cartels, abandoned mines, and broken promises. Hlatshwayo says that it is not just mining giants like Glencore, Exxaro, Sasol, Seriti, and Thungela that supply Europe’s energy needs. There are also shady coal cartels operating in Mpumalanga. He mentions mines like Golfview, part of Anker group based in the Netherlands, where he used to work during his zama zama days. 

‘These are zombie mines,” he explains, “owned by cartels who vanish when the police come. The ownership is always changing and unclear. They used to chase us as illegal miners, with the help of the police, while also mining illegally there. While working as a zama zama, clients often asked us to load trucks with coal for export. At one point, they asked us to load seven trucks with coal for export to Europe. They see coal mined by Zama Zamas as good for exports and very cheap.’

The devastation that is caused by mining is felt way beyond Khuthala community, it is prevalent across Mpumalanga. Phola is a town surrounded by mines that include an opencast mine owned by Seriti Resources that largely supplies European markets. The town is marred by unemployment and demonstrations for better rights, and seems abandoned by the outside world. Community areas are filled with garbage merging in towering piles, and locals say that there are issues with the water supply. 

Air pollution is a daily reality for residents. The widespread smell of coal, particularly around Phola, is immediately noticeable upon entering the province. For  Nonhlanhla Mabuza, an activist under Mining Affected Communities United in Action (MACUA), the constant exposure to coal dust has become part of daily life.  “We are so used to coal that we cannot smell it anymore, but we see the coal dust everywhere in our houses”, says Mabuza.

Standing just two kilometers away from the KPSX project, Seriti’s new open-cast extension of the Klipspruit Colliery, Mabuza notes, “Blasting activities at the mine site happen almost every day, generating tremors and you can see clouds of smoke rising, polluting Phola’s atmosphere”, she says. 

Another Phola resident, Nkosana Mavuso, a local youth activist who started the ‘MP Rise Podcast’ (MP for Mpumalanga), agrees to an interview in the back of our hire car, parked up in the crumbling centre of Phola. He confirms the high suicide rates, with one of his friends recently falling victim. ‘Poverty is the cause, and people here are not employed,’ he says.

Mavuso’s story is a stark insight into the reality of life in a coal town like Phola. Yet despite coal destructive impacts and the JETPs efforts, our analysis of Global Coal Mine Tracker data reveals that South Africa could even see a growth in coal mining activity, as of April 2024: 65 of South Africa’s 82 operating coal mines are located in Mpumalanga and there are 23 proposed mines – six of which are under construction. The proposed mines could add more than 62 million tonnes per annum to Mpumalanga’s production.

‘It’s a free-for-all at the moment’, said Angus Burns, a local activist who works for the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). ‘Existing coal mines are a problem, but the real issue is the new ones being proposed. 2,500 permit mines pending’, he says.

Nowhere is this scramble for coal more evident than in the countries export ports. Soot-stained juggernauts loaded with coal for Europe grind to a halt along the N2 highway into Richard’s Bay, a once-idyllic fishing village and laid-back surf resort, creating a tailback of hundreds of articulated lorries for kilometres into the distance. Here, the once-green wildlife flanking the main road is ashen and obscured from sunlight, and those who sell bananas to the stranded truck drivers are forced to wrap clothes around their mouths to battle the coal dust.

South Africa’s economy is hooked on coal. According to the world bank coal rents made up 2.4 % of South Africa’s GDP. The Department of Mineral Resources and Energy states that about 77 per cent of South Africa’s primary energy needs are provided by coal; and about 28 per cent of South Africa’s coal production is exported, mainly through the Richards Bay Coal Terminal, making South Africa the fourth-largest coal exporting country in the world. 

The reminders of Johannesburg’s economic entrenchment in mining can be seen everywhere, from the glass iceberg that is the Illovo offices of energy company Seriti, to the yellow 125-tonne truck that stands as a monolithic public sculpture in Ferreirasdorp. Johannesburg’s province, the mining hub of Gauteng, is built on digging, with commercial mining taking hold 150 years ago, starting as a scattering of gold rush tents and evolving into a multi-billion-dollar industry. If the glittering office blocks and mining memorials are anything to go by, those who have profited don’t want you to forget where all that money came from. 

Pao-Yu Oei, professor of Sustainable Energy Transition Economy at the European University of Flensburg, Germany, points out that for countries such as South Africa, the global phase-out of coal presents a twofold problem.

‘On the one hand, around 80% of electricity is still generated from mostly old and unreliable coal-fired power plants, which are reportedly falling apart, making a switch from coal to renewable energy necessary, but demanding lots of new investments. In addition, a high share of South Africa’s GDP is based on exporting coal; if importers stop buying South African coal, it would result in a loss of much-needed revenue for the country’, Says Oei. 

He adds, ‘You would have to replace selling coal with selling different kinds of export products, and it’s not that easy for South Africa.’

To make things more difficult, coal is entwined in South Africa’s ruling party. The former coal miner and current Minerals and Petroleum Resources Minister, Gwede Mantashe, is a coal loyalist. According to reports for the Daily Maverick, Mantashe praised a long future for South African coal. ‘We are still mining coal aggressively everywhere where we find it. There is no limitation. Look at this mine, it has a 20-year life,’ Mantashe said in March 2025 at the opening of a new mine in Mpumalanga set to produce a million tonnes per annum. ‘Coal mining will be here in South Africa for about 200 years,’ the Daily Maverick quoted Mantashe as saying.

Mantashe’s remarks, the continued neglect and poverty found in coal mining regions, and the government’s recent extension of coal plant lifespans—along with exemptions from pollution laws—raises questions about the South African government’s commitments to JETP, the power of the South African coal lobby and the government’s ability to wean itself off coal. Meanwhile, the EU’s continued import of South African coal could not only undermine JETP targets, it also connects European markets to environmental and human rights disasters, a far cry from the JETP’s just transition rhetoric.

Africa Climate Alliance says ‘[the EU] needs to address the hypocrisy it perpetuates in which their actions tell a different story to their claims and promises’

‘These contradictory signals are terrible for the progress of a Just Transition Partnership and indicate that the EU is only using renewable energy finance as a neocolonial tactic while maintaining fossil fuels rather than an actual mutually-beneficial partnership,’ said a spokesperson for Africa Climate Alliance. ‘It stalls renewable energy expansion, increases ecological and social harm and goes against climate commitments in a world already facing escalating climate impacts.’

The IEA reports that global coal use was at an estimated 8.77 billion tonnes in 2024, the highest ever. With countries and corporations backtracking on their climate commitments, it’s an important time for the EU to deliver on its climate promises in a meaningful and inclusive way. However, it’s not just up to the EU and the IPG. For South Africa to deliver a just transition and a phase-out from coal, it must seriously look at its own economy, government and socioeconomic issues.

Report by Sakhile Dube, Oliver Stallwood and Jack Wolf.

This article was supported by Journalismfund Europe.

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In recent years, Ghana has experienced a notable increase in digital threats—particularly those targeting journalists, activists, and human rights defenders. Women journalists have become especially vulnerable to gender-based abuse, including threats of violence, doxing, and smear campaigns. These attacks are often strategically orchestrated to discredit journalism, silence critical voices, and erode public trust in the media.

According to UNESCO, more than 73% of women journalists globally have experienced some form of online harassment, with many African journalists facing increasingly coordinated attacks. In Ghana, these digital threats are worsened by limited institutional support, weak reporting mechanisms, and inadequate digital safety training in newsrooms, as highlighted by the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA).

DisinfoEye is iWatch Africa’s strategic response—designed to empower journalists, especially women, with the tools, training, and support necessary to navigate and counter online abuse and misinformation. This initiative is part of the organization’s broader commitment to defending digital rights and press freedom across the region.

As part of the DisinfoEye campaign, 20 journalists were selected to undergo intensive training in digital safety, fact-checking, and online harassment response. These journalists will act as focal points in their respective newsrooms, leading the establishment of Online Safety Units to track and respond to abuse and disinformation.

“The rise in coordinated online attacks against women journalists is alarming,” said Gideon Sarpong, co-founder of iWatch Africa. “DisinfoEye is a bold response that combines data, advocacy, and training to ensure the digital space does not silence those who hold power to account.”

Real-time digital platform for reporting and support

A core component of the campaign is the upcoming launch of an interactive digital platform that allows for real-time reporting and monitoring of online abuse and disinformation incidents. Journalists can anonymously report cases of harassment and receive timely support. The platform will also serve as a critical data resource for policy advocacy and coordinated stakeholder responses.

DisinfoEye is driven by strong partnerships with technology companies, human rights organizations, regulatory bodies, and media watchdogs. Data collected through the platform will be shared with these stakeholders to inform policy changes and tech interventions, ensuring a more secure online environment for journalists.

Digital campaign to reach over 5 million Ghanaians

Beyond the newsroom, DisinfoEye includes a nationwide digital awareness campaign aimed at reaching over 5 million citizens. The campaign features engaging videos, infographics, and interactive media to educate the public on the harms of disinformation and the importance of protecting women journalists online.

iWatch Africa envisions a democratic society where journalists—especially women—can work free from fear and intimidation. DisinfoEye is not only a response to immediate threats but a forward-looking initiative that redefines how digital safety and accountability are pursued in Ghana.

The launch of DisinfoEye represents a critical milestone in the fight against online abuse and disinformation in Ghana. Through a combination of training, real-time data tracking, public advocacy, and institutional collaboration, iWatch Africa is addressing both the symptoms and root causes of online violence.

By empowering journalists, establishing newsroom safety units, and promoting a culture of digital responsibility, DisinfoEye reinforces the message that no journalist—especially women—should be silenced, intimidated, or forced offline for doing their job.

The digital space must be a platform for constructive dialogue, not a weapon of harm—and with DisinfoEye, Ghana takes a bold and necessary step in that direction.

Source: iWatch Africa

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